Part Two: Latin America5. The Very Long March of HistoryTable of Contents Kees Koonings Labour’s role(1) within the process of economic development and socio-political change in Latin America has acquired increasing significance since the early twentieth century(2). This has gone hand in hand with the growth of the Latin American economies, first in response to a rising demand for primary exports and later as the result of rapid urbanization and inward-oriented strategies of industrialization. The first categories of labour to gain a voice were those employed in the large-scale export and transportation sectors during the first decades of this century. Since the 1930s, urban labour, increasingly industrial, has been among the social sectors that sought active participation in the political process of many Latin American countries. The formation of syndicates and trade unions became an important part of the social incorporation and politicization of the Latin American working class. Between the 1930s and 1960s, organized labour in many countries was able to join, or in some cases be drawn into, populist alliances together with anti-oligarchic politicians, industrialists, civil servants and the military. From the 1960s onwards, economic and political changes have affected the position of wage labourers and their organizations. The diversification and modernization of manufacturing industry in a number of countries provoked an increasing differentiation of the industrial labour force. At the same time, the rise to power of authoritarian regimes in important countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay led to the political exclusion of organized labour. To a certain extent this contributed to the erosion of real wage levels for significant segments of labour in these countries. Finally, the capacity of formal urban labour markets to absorb labour stagnated relative to the expansion of the urban population, leading to an increase in social inequality, poverty and un- and underemployment. Since the late 1970s the Latin American economies have faced a broader crisis which further complicated the situation of the working class in many countries of the region. In fact, from the early 1980s up to the present, profound socio-economic and political changes have affected labour, labour relations and trade unionism in Latin America. These developments are: • The breakdown of the conventional model of closed, inward-oriented development
in Latin America, based on import-substituting industrialization (151), and its
replacement by structural adjustment, liberalization and a more open integration into the
global economic order. In various ways these current trends affect the nature and functioning of formal labour markets, the role of trade unions and the relations between organized labour and the state. To a certain extent this constitutes a clear break with the historic patterns of development and labour issues in the region that have predominated from the 1920s until the early 1980s. This chapter aims to discuss these recent developments against the backdrop of the historic evolution of the economy, industry, labour, trade unions and the state in Latin America(3). It discusses, first, the main features of the Latin American model of development, mainly industrialization and its consequences for the labour market prior to the 1980s. Second, the history of trade unionism in the region is traced and the development of state—trade union relations discussed. The next three sections deal, respectively, with the post-1980 consequences of economic liberalization, democratic consolidation and informalization for labour, labour markets and labour organizations. The Latin American development model and labour, 1900—80 (top) Following the seminal analysis of Cardoso and Faletto (1979), the general literature usually characterizes the Latin American model of development up till the early 1980s as one of ISI combined with primary exports. With some qualifications, this model can be applied to the larger countries of the region and divided into a number of phases. The result has been, to a certain extent, a regionally consistent pattern of production, labour absorption, income distribution and rural—urban relations(4). The expansion of world trade prompted by European and North American industrialization after 1850 led to the early incorporation of the Latin American economies into the global economic system. This expansion provoked a rapidly increasing demand for a number of primary export commodities from Latin America. Export sectors in Argentina (meat and wheat), Brazil (coffee), Chile (nitrate and copper), Colombia (coffee and gold), Mexico (metals and oil), Peru (guano), Uruguay (meat and wool) and Venezuela (oil) expanded vigorously between the 1870s and 1930. The effects of this on overall socio-economic change were tremendous: export growth brought in large quantities of investment and income as a result of which production and demand increased; infrastructure was expanded to meet the requirements of export activities; and large-scale mines and plantations were established mainly by foreign investors, while the first manufacturing firms were established by domestic agricultural or commercial entrepreneurs in the wake of the export boom (Cerutti and Vellinga 1989). These processes contributed to the first wave of urbanization in the region. Wage labour made its appearance as a large-scale phenomenon in mining, plantation agriculture, railways, ports, and also in light industries such as food processing and textiles. Massive immigration from Europe and Asia contributed to the formation of a (mostly urban) wage labour force in countries such as Mexico, Peru, Chile, and above all Argentina and Brazil. The penetration of mercantile and capitalist relations into the countryside led to the advance of part-time wage labour among the peasantry, especially around large mines and plantations. The second phase of the Latin American development pattern can be placed roughly between the crisis of the 1930s and the early 1950s. During these two decades, Latin America had to come to terms with the breakdown of the primary export boom of the pre-1930 era. At first by default, and from the late 1930s onwards by design, domestic manufacturing emerged as the new leading economic sector in the major Latin American countries. Many of the industrial firms that were able to expand during the 1930s had been founded in the previous decades of export wealth. Their growth was stimulated by the impossibility of maintaining previous import levels. However, governments soon discovered the strategic importance of industrialization as a new strategy for national development. In one country after another, the late 1930s and the 1940s witnessed the onset of deliberate state intervention to complement the expansion of existing domestic industries. The latter were predominantly owned by domestic entrepreneurs and mostly covered branches of traditional mass consumer goods such as foodstuffs, beverages, cigarettes, textiles, footwear, clothing, furniture, soap and simple metalworking. However, the production of modern consumer goods expanded from the 1930s onwards (Weaver 1980: 125). Governments started to build up basic industries such as steel production, oil refining and electricity. This phase of easy import substitution received an additional boost immediately after the end of the Second World War due to the accumulation of foreign exchange during the conflict. During these decades the urban working class, especially formal industrial wage labour, expanded. The domestic industries were mainly labour intensive and most labour in the industrial plants was low-skilled. The employment of women and children was commonplace. However, a gradual process of differentiation within the urban—industrial labour force set in as the size and the level of capitalization of the largest firms increased (Weaver 1980: 138—9). Workers in the larger factories tended to be more skilled and better paid than their colleagues in small- and medium-sized establishments. From the 1950s onwards, the industrialization model of the major Latin American countries went through important structural changes. Economic historians speak of the transition from the easy to the advanced or dynamic phase of import substitution. In countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela this new phase was above all marked by a rapid increase in foreign direct investment in manufacturing. Transnational firms entered new industrial branches that were intensive in their use of capital and technology. They mainly catered to the fast-growing urban middle-class market for consumer durables such as cars, household appliances, radios and television sets. Foreign investors also entered or revitalized existing markets such as food processing, beverages, tobacco processing, pharmaceuticals and chemicals. These developments were complemented by an often spectacular expansion of direct state involvement in industrial and related activities. Large public companies were established for steel production, oil refining, chemical production, electricity, transportation, mining and development banking. As a result, the establishment size and concentration ratios in the modern dynamic industries increased. Typically, the largest industrial groups evolved into tripartite ventures including transnational firms, state capital and privately-owned domestic firms(5). Consequently, the composition of the industrial sector in the major Latin American countries changed. The new dynamic sectors controlled by foreign or tripartite firms increased their share of total manufacturing output. Employment in these activities expanded, but not at the same pace as invested capital or manufacturing output. This reflected the increasing productivity of labour in the modern large-scale establishments as compared with small- and medium-sized workshops and plants. Still, total industrial employment in Latin America continued to expand rapidly throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. In fact, the structure of the labour market underwent important modifications. Labour became increasingly urban, not only in manufacturing but also in the public sector and services. Informal urban labour proved to be a structural element of the urban economies (see pp. 116—120). Also in the countryside, wage labour became increasingly significant as large-scale commercial agriculture expanded in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. Brazil and Mexico, the two major countries that advanced most along the road of import substitution, recorded particularly impressive rates of growth of industrial output and employment. Argentina, a leading industrial country in Latin America during the first half of this century, lost ground from the 1950s onwards as the country entered a prolonged period ‘of relative industrial stagnation (Infante and Klein 1991; Weaver 1980: 126 and 145). Though the 151 model constituted the basis for impressive economic growth in a number of countries, especially between 1950 and 1975, it also incorporated a set of fundamental economic and socio-political difficulties. As far as industrialization performance was concerned, the emphasis on large-scale manufacturing for the domestic market did not eliminate the bottleneck of insufficient foreign exchange being generated by the export sector. Import needs shifted, however, from finished goods to more crucial intermediary goods, machinery, technology and energy. While dynamic industrialization advanced, the export sectors, however, retained their traditional characteristics in terms of composition, productivity and value-added. Furthermore, the policies of most Latin American countries discriminated against exports and agriculture in favour of industrial investment and urban income. The continued dependence on increasingly strategic imports, unmatched by an expansion of exports, in combination with a rapid increase of direct state involvement in economic activities contributed to chronic trade imbalances and budget deficits,’ inducing permanent inflation (Furtado 1970). Furthermore, protective barriers led to an often inefficient and oligopolistic industrial structure. The prevailing patterns of manufacturing were aimed at a relatively reduced market consisting of elite and middle-class consumers. Combined with the limited labour-absorptive capacity of the dynamic industries, this pattern accentuated the tendency of social dualization and often extremely unequal income distribution. The often stagnant agricultural sector further aggravated these problems through an inadequate food supply to the urban sector insufficient primary exports and persistent rural poverty. Rural poverty as well as the labour-saving effects of agricultural modernization, when it did occur, fed the increasing stream of rural—urban migrants and thus the informal labour market. The economic and social drawbacks of the Latin American model of development came to light especially after the ~iid-1970s when both its internal and external macro-economic conditions took a turn for the worse and its adverse social consequences became manifest. After 1973 most Latin American countries took recourse to external lending to adjust their balance-of-payments and investment problems. Notably, countries like Brazil and Mexico hoped to weather the recession in this manner. Brazil even initiated an ambitious third phase of import substitution by promoting basic and heavy industry, domestic capital-goods production, high-tech manufacturing and non-traditional primary and manufacturing exports. As is well known, these and similar strategies employed by Latin American countries ran into decisive trouble after 1982 with the onset of the debt crisis. This crisis heralded the end of 50 years of inward-oriented development, calling for major reorientation of economic and social strategies in the region. During these post-war decades of urban—industrial development a notable segmentation of the labour markets in the Latin American economies came to light. The sectoral distribution of the labour force underwent important transformations between 1950 and 1980. In 1980, only 32 per cent of the labour force was employed in agriculture as against 55 per cent in 1950. An enormous shift had taken place away from agriculture to industry (26 per cent) and services (42 per cent). The level of urbanization rose rapidly for most Latin American countries: the share of the urban population in Latin America as a whole increased from 48 per cent in 1960 to 62 in 1980 (Gilbert and Gugler 1983: 7). A second, relatively less-pronounced but nonetheless significant trend concerned occupational mobility towards higher-earning jobs in the private sector or the rapidly expanding public sector. By 1980 some 20 per cent of formal urban employment consisted of public-sector jobs (Infante and Klein 1991). Third, in spite of a decline in relative underemployment (from 46 to 40 per cent between 1950 and 1980), the absolute number of underemployed rose from 27 to 49 million people during the same period. Finally, a pronounced segmentation into dual markets had become a persistent feature of both urban and rural labour markets. Despite the high mobility rates — from rural to urban and from low-wage to high-wage occupations — the inequalities in the overall structure of labour remuneration were not reduced. Furthermore, within the traditional peasant sector and the urban informal sector additional differentiation in remuneration was linked to occupational segmentation and increasing social stratification. In effect, workers in the large-scale private and public industries and associated public services consolidated as a relatively privileged minority within the working class (Weaver 1980:158; Wynia 1990: 61). They earned better wages, acquired skills, had access to company — and public — welfare schemes, and were incorporated into influential trade unions. By and large, the material position of this segment of the labour force developed more favourably compared with workers in traditional, unskilled, small- and medium-sized manufacturing, the informal sector and agriculture (Touraine 1989: 72—3). This segmentation of the labour market was also reflected in Latin American social structures. A number of authors (for example, Portes 1985; Touraine 1989) have pointed at the structural duality of Latin American societies.6 Until the late 1970s economic growth did lead to increases in the absolute level of employment and in the total number of people living above specified poverty lines. A growing number of people, however, were forced to rely upon informal activities within the urban economies, and small-scale informal activities generally remained a large component of the urban—industrial sector. At the same time, the related phenomenon of urban poverty did not diminish very much prior to 1980, while increasing in absolute as well as relative terms after 1980 (Altimir 1981; Feres and Leon 1990). The implications of the post-198O developments with regard to the economy, labour market and poverty are discussed below (pp. 108—112 and 116—120). Trade unions and socio-political relations, 1900—80 (top) The expansion of capitalist relations of production in primary exports and light manufacturing, increasing urbanization, and immigration of mainly European workers laid the foundations for the rise of workers’ organizations and trade unions from the late-nineteenth century. Ideologies on workers’ strategies were diffused from Europe through immigrants, pamphlets and other means. During the first two decades of the twentieth century, anarcho-syndicalist rather than social-democratic orientations dominated the nascent labour movement. After 1917 communism became influential among Latin American syndicates. Labour unions and federations were set up to unite these localized organizations of workers. Their actions varied according to country, period and sector, but usually entailed combinations of direct demands and more general manifestations ot dissatisfaction with the social conditions of the workers. The strike was the most commonly used instrument to support demands against employers and the government. Prior to 1930, some advances were made across the continent on wage levels, working hours, trade union rights and social welfare for urban wage labour. Especially in the countries where trade unions were most effectively organized, namely Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, headway was made in the adoption of progressive laboi~t legislation and social-welfare policies by responsive governments: Battle in Uruguay, Yrigoyen in Argentina, and Alessandri in Chile. Rather more frequently, however, trade union activities were met by repressive legislation or state and employers’ violence (Berqu~st 1986; Spalding 1977). After 1930 the issue of labour’s political incorporation decisively entered the considerations of contending political groups in the principal countries of the region. The social changes provoked by decades of economic growth started to erode the consensus underpinning therule of the oligarchic elites linked to the export sector. The new contenders for political power included the military, modernizing political elites, urban entrepreneurs, the urban middle class and organized labour. A new configuration of power arose in a number of countries based on coalitions of these segments organized by populist politicians or regimes. Whether through elections (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay), prolonged revolution (Mexico) or intra-elite rebellion (Brazil) populist regimes came to power. They adopted industrialization, popular mobilization and modest social reform as their main objectives. The role of trade unions was modified in this new situation. Instead of standing in opposition against employers and the state, the labour movement became tied to what Touraine (1989) calls the national-popular state.7 By and large, the role of trade unions shifted from direct revindication of workers’ interests to being the vehicles for political action by organized labour in the populist alliances. In most cases increasing political participation reduced trade union autonomy. Co-optation, regulation or outright organization by the state affected the actions of trade unions. Notoriously, the state took control of organized labour through restrictive legislation, financial control and direct co-optation or control of union leadership. In exchange, the interests of labour were recognized as politically legitimate and given a place in the corporatist articulation of sectoral social interests. Furthermore the state ensured the protection of labour through legislation and the extension of social benefits, often making use of the institutions of trade unions themselves to distriGute these. This incorporation of organized labour in national—popular regimes assumed its most typical forms in Argentina (under Peronism or justicialismo), Brazil (under Vargas-inspired trabalhismo) and Mexico (under the post-revolutionary order organized by the Institutional Revolutionary Party — PRI). The insertion of labour into the national—popular state also occurred under varying political conditions at different moments in time in other countries: liberal democracy (Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela), oligarchic democracy (Colombia) or different types of revolutionary or post-revolutionary regimes (Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua). The 1960s witnessed the onset of sudden and violent ruptures from this model in some of the principal Latin American countries. The military takeover in Brazil in 1964 inaugurated an era of institutionalized authoritarianism in Latin America. The rise of ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian’ regimes (O’Donnell 1973; Collier 1979) had profound effects on the socio-political role of organized labour. It meant the breakdown of the compromise state and national—populist alliances. Organized labour became suddenly marginalized politically in Brazil (1964), Argentina (1966 and 1976), Chile (1973), Uruguay (1973) and a number of other countries. The new dictatorships moved from the prior incorporation of popular sectors to their exclusion from power and policy making. The underlying rationale of these regimes is often presented in terms of the increasing incompatibility of reconciling economic restructuring with popular socio-economic demands (O’Donnell 1973), but the political and ideological dimensions of the ‘new authoritarianism’ were at least as important (8). At any rate, the reorientation of development policies conflicted with the material and political interests of organized labour. On the politico-ideological level the new authoritarian regimes represented an elite and middle-class response to real or perceived threats to the existing social and political order. Organized labour became part of the ‘internal enemy’ (Alves 1985; Perelli 1990). Military institutions took the lead in Brazil, the Southern Cone, Bolivia, Central America, and — more covertly — Colombia. Trade unions and workers’ parties were prohibited or strictly controlled. Peru and Ecuador provided deviant examples of reformist militarism (Kruijt 1991), but although these regimes declared themselves in favour of mass popular participation, they did not resolve the problem of labour’s incorporation as successfully as did the Mexican PRI. According to some analysts (for example, Portes 1985: 3 1—3) the advent of the new dictatorships, in combination with the changing patterns of social relations in the urban domain in Latin America (see pp. 10 1—105) led to a shift in popular collective action from the classical capital—labour opposition towards a new type of confrontation between the authoritarian state and the ‘new social movements’. While it cannot be denied that trade unions were seriously affected by the actions of the authoritarian regimes (and also by the not-so-openly authoritarian states as in the case of Colombia), this formulation overemphasizes the earlier significance of the classical Western European and North American model of organized-labour strategies in Latin America. Already under populism, the state had become the principal interlocutor of organized labour. It is true that with the restriction of trade unionism under authoritarianism, the growing number of urban workers, including both formal and informal workers, was forced to develop alternative channels for organization and interest representation. Simultaneously, urban workers, together with other segments of the urban poor, confronted increasingly difficult conditions to gain their livelihood. To a certain extent their common condition as impoverished urban residents, sharing the same neighbourhoods, housing conditions and lack of access to basic public services, replaced the workfloor as the main focus of collective action. Nevertheless, trade unions made efforts to escape from the authoritarian deadlock. The Brazilian case of ‘new syndicalism’ is the most noteworthy. From the late 1970s, vigorous new trade unions succeeded in sidestepping the tightly controlled trade union system set up under Getdlio Vargas and preserved by the military. Metal workers in the São Paulo agglomeration defied labour laws and national security legislation in order to demand wage increases from the large industrial firms in the area. Labour demands gradually evolved into open criticism of the trade union system and of authoritarian politics (Munck 1981). Not only did this massive movement lead to the foundation of the Partido dos Trabajadores and the political ascendancy of Luis Indcio Lula da Silva, but the movement also developed close links to the new urban movements and to massive popular mobilization in favour of democracy and social reform (Alves 1985; Kowarick 1985). In Brazil as well as in other countries, trade unions played an active part in the retreat or collapse of authoritarianism and the transition to democracy in the 1980s (see pp. 112—116). Economic liberalization, labour and trade unions (top) When Mexico announced its inability to continue its debt servicing in 1982, Latin America’s debt problem was transformed into a major debt crisis. It triggered three years of profound and widespread economic crisis, followed by almost a decade of efforts by Latin American governments to counter the crisis through structural adjustment measures. In terms of macro-economic performance, structural adjustment ~ has produced widely diverging outcomes, but in terms of social consequences the outcomes have been more uniformly negative (Ghai and Hewitt 1990). It has become manifest that the short- and medium-term costs of crisis and adjustment have been borne by the poorer, less privileged and less organized groups in Latin American societies. In general terms, the debt crisis meant severe balance of payment problems, which, in turn, led to a decreasing capacity to import, invest and maintain public spending. The overall consequences included economic recession, rising interest rates, declining welfare spending, increasing unemployment and growing poverty. This situation has driven governments across the region to adopt measures to restore the balance of payments, restrict government expenditure, counter inflation, restore economic growth through liberalization and attend to various often conflictive distributive demands. To complicate matters further, many countries faced the need to consolidate democratic political systems (Frieden 1989). These imperatives often proved to be economically and politically irreconcilable. Here the discussion will be limited to the effects on labour and trade unions. Labour and its organizations are confronted with four consequences of the economic crisis and adjustment: a decline in the level of real wages, rising open unemployment, a liberalization and flexibilization of the economy, especially manufacturing, and socio-economic government policies that are unfavourable to workers or the poor in general. Each aspect will be discussed in turn. Since the onset of the crisis, real wages have shown a declining trend. The decline was most severe in Mexico and Peru; only Brazil registered a positive trend in real wage levels, largely due to the price freeze of the Cruzado plan in 1986 (Roxborough 1989: 91—2). This decline was induced by the sharp economic downturn which forced firms to control labour costs. In many cases trade unions found it difficult to protect wage levels through collective bargaining or militant action. As a rule, well-organized workers in advanced industries, strategic sectors and public enterprises were more successful than workers in traditional low-pay, low-skill activities. Citing Tokman, Ghai and Hewitt (1990: 23) indicate an average decline in manufacturing wages of 8.4 per cent between 1980 and 1985, while the decline in income of minimum-wage earners, construction workers and informal-sector workers was significantly (up to three times) higher. In addition, high levels of inflation particularly affected the purchasing power of wage earners since they depended on periodic wage and price-level adjustments, often government regulated. Such adjustments were mostly too little and too late. Rising open unemployment appeared as a relatively new phenomenon in the wake of the crisis. Both private firms and public agencies were forced to resort to massive lay-offs, either to realize payroll reductions because of competitive pressure or because of structural adjustment-induced downsizing. As is shown by Roxborough (1989: 92), the levels of open unemployment for Latin America as a whole rose from 6.3 per cent of the labour force in 1980 to 10.2 per cent in 1987 (see also Portes 1989). In the 1980s the loss of formal jobs was not as easily made up by the expansion of informal-sector activities as it had been previously. Increasing open unemployment not only contributed to the downward pressure upon wage levels but also hampered the trade unions’ capacity to bargain for better wages and other benefits. The willingness of Latin American workers to engage in direct labour conflicts declined as the threat of job losses became more imminent. Increasingly also, governments revoked protective legislation that traditionally had secured job stability for important categories of industrial- and public-sector employees. By and large, trade unions in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela have been unable to counter these changing patterns within the labour market. The need to defend the direct material interests of workers under these conditions has been a novel theme for Latin American trade unions as they were used to operating in a more political way to secure workers’ benefits through state policies (Touraine 1989: 278—SO). While trade unions have succeeded in gaining a larger measure of autonomy since the early 1980s in the countries where they had been particularly involved in corporatist arrangements (Roxborough 1989: 91—2), this, at the same time, meant the vanishing of the state’s traditional willingness to respond favourably to organized labour’s demands. By and large; trade unions have experienced a reduction in their capacity to circumvent labour-market pressures on wage levels and hiring through the collective bargaining process. While the short-term effects of crisis and adjustment for labour are evidenced by wage declines and rising unemployment, a longer-term implication concerns the reformulation of development strategies and the re-insertion of the Latin American economies into the world economy. Most Latin American countries have adhered to the tenets of opening up their economies to international trade and investment. Therefore production must achieve international levels of competitiveness. Some countries, notably Chile, Mexico and Argentina~ have had considerable success in recent years in reviving economic growth under conditions of economic liberalization. In fact, during the past few years economic growth has returned and analysts have become somewhat more optimistic about future developments (CEPAL 1991; 1DB 1992). In addition to the expansion of exports and a recent boom of stock markets, the capital balance has shown timid positive figures. For industry to recover, however, more is needed than the mere implementation of orthodox policy prescriptions .under structural adjustment packages. Comparisons with the successful East Asian NICs show that technological development and the formation of human capital are essential preconditions for sustained industrial development which depends crucially on maximizing competitive, as against comparative, advantages within the global economic system (Gereffl and Wyman 1990). Latin American governments will have to pursue more autonomous policies in this field instead of yielding to the short-term interests of traditional economic groups such as large agricultural exporters, monopolistic industrialists, bankers or managers of public companies. The implications for labour of such new directions are far-reaching. The macro-economic justification for relatively high wage levels under an 151 strategy is replaced by wage restraints as an element within the effort to enhance international competitiveness. Both the restructuring of economic sectors and the need to increase technological and skill levels call for the participation of labour in these changes, rather than its forced compliance. Sub-contracting and flexible management practices will have a profound impact on labour and its organizations. Many governments have abolished job security. The flexibilization of the labour force and sub-contracting have become legal and increasingly used methods to minimize costs and avoid the implications of stable employment contracts. As a result, large groups of workers and salaried employees have lost their job security and have been dismissed. Some of those who lose their jobs are rehired through sub-contracting or temporary employment, while many others have been forced to secure an income in the informal sector. Trade unions will have to respond to these changing circumstances. Increasingly, unions in manufacturing industry and advanced service sectors are abandoning their traditional opposition to management strategies and technological, modernization. This implies a reconceptualization of ‘the enterprise’, its vital interests, the combined responsibilities of management and labour, and the benefits of upgrading labour in terms of human resource approaches. Intra-enterprise and intra-sectoral problems and strategies become a focus of concern for trade unions. During the past decade labour militancy has been directed increasingly against the overall socio-economic situation through the proliferation of political strikes. Greater autonomy and capacity to organize on the (con)federational level has pitched the trade unions against the general economic and social policies adopted by governments as part of structural adjustment programmes. The typical aspects attacked by (con)federations and their political allies were the orthodox adjustment policy in itself (since it foretold recession and hence loss of income and jobs), as well as specific elements such as the curtailment of welfare spending and subsidies by the state (since it diminished access to social services such as health care, education, housing, cheap basic foodstuffs and transportation), public-sector lay-offs, and even privatization schemes of public companies (since it threatened wages and jobs in these companies as well as other public-sector privileges and trade union influence). As living standards dropped, especially for the urban poor, and general poverty levels increased, socio-political militancy sponsored by trade unions together with other popular, grassroots organizations often prevailed over more narrowly focused actions in defence of wages and jobs. This trend marks the difficult reorientation of the political position of organized labour in the complex environment of adjustment imperatives combined with the task of consolidating new and old democracies in the region. Democratic consolidation and state—labour relations (top) Organized labour was a major actor in the recent processes of transition to democracy in a number of former dictatorships in Latin America. Exclusion and repression by the military regimes may have led to a temporary de-activation of trade unions, but these regimes never succeeded in totally eradicating the capacity of the unions to act. In countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, organized labour resumed its militancy in the late 1970s. The unions moved from purely defensive actions to a more political stance, criticizing the dictatorships and demanding a return to democracy. In these three countries, organized labour was one of the galvanizing forces behind mass popular protests that contributed in important ways to the end of authoritarianism. But also in other cases (Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Peru) organized labour participated in various ways in the popular campaigns and socio-political alliances that marked efforts at transition or democratic consolidation during the late 1970s and 1980s. Even in a semi-authoritarian situation such as the Mexican one, some sectors within the trade unions, but outside the government-backed Central de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM), tried to distance themselves from the PM-dominated system. The wider literature on democratic transitions and consolidation concurs on the following combinations of social forces and political mechanisms that made the demise of authoritarianism possible (11).’ Within the regime itself, and especially within the military, the notion Part 2: Section 5A
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