 |
 |
| TOC -- Preface | Introduction | Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | |
Part Three: Africa
Section 8: A Context of Sharp Economic Decline
Table of Contents
Approaches to African studies
Political development
Part 3: Section 8A
Paschal Mihyo
Freek Schtphorst
This chapter aims to provide the wider framework within which labour relations operate in Africa. The analysis is limited to sub-Saharan Africa, a term commonly used to denote the 47 African countries south of the Sahara, excluding South Africa. First the chapter briefly addresses the problem of approaches to African studies before analysing political and economic developments. It concludes with a general survey of the labour-market situation, trade unions and unprotected labour.
Approaches to African studies (top)
A variety of approaches has been adopted in African studies, which need examination before one can address the crisis in Africa. The first issue is whether the African state is on ‘the decline’ (Turner and Young 1985) or whether, in fiict, the state has been gaining strength and becoming more capable of controlling the African population, thereby eliminating opposition. Related to this is the question of whether the African state is more appropriately characterized as a ‘lame Leviathan’ (Callagy 1987) or, in the same vein, as weak and suspended above society (Hyden 1983). The weakness of the African state is relative, depending on the aspect of it under consideration. The failure of the state to provide basic services or to develop clear policies for structural change may justify its characterization as weak or even ‘soft’ as has been done by authors such as Rothchild (1987). In terms of the way it has controlled political processes, however, incorporated all potential opposition groups, controlled the population through systems like the kebele system in Ethiopia, the ten-cell system in Tanzania, the committees for the defence of the revolution in Ghana or the dynamization groups in Mozambique, the state is neither a lame Leviathan nor suspended above society, nor is it ‘omnipresent but impotent’ as has been asserted by Chazan (Rothchild and Chazan 1988). In some cases it has been a killer state either through repression or neglect, and this is in no way a sign of weakness, decay, decline or omnipotence.
The second issue to be considered is whether the authoritarianism of the political parties which has led Africa to its present decline was endemic or acquired. Most existing studies that base themselves on decline and decay theories tend to project the authoritarian tendency of African states as an unfortunate trend into which regimes grew. The theory of the state in Africa as a patrimonial one characterized by growing corruption and personalization of authority, and the theories which look at the African state as a prebendal state (Jackson and Roseberg 1982) tend to confirm the notion of decay. However, they fail to investigate the possible authoritarian tendencies of African political parties prior to independence.
Such analysis could lead to a different assessment of the roots of authoritarianism. As early as 1963, Kilson (1963: 263) in a lonesome voice warned that the parties challenging colonial rule in Africa were organized on undemocratic lines, mobilized the people through threats and coercion, and had vindictive agendas for punishing their opponents once they came to power. The Kenya African National Union (KANU), the ruling party, emerged out of a tribal organization committed to the expulsion of all non-Kikuyus, black or white, from the Central Highlands. In Tanzania, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) warned its opponents that they would die in exile and would be denied water, jobs and clothing. The dominant parties in Ghana, Swaziland and Zambia had mobilization songs which conveyed similar threats.
In Ghana the persecution of the opposition commenced immediately after Kwame Nkrumah came to power in 1958 with 54 per cent of the vote. Within the first three years he passed censorship laws, and by October 1960 had detained 115 members of the opposition (the United Party). In Kenya, the opposition party, KADU (Kenya African Democratic Union), was offered an opportunity to join KANU in the interests of national unity. The current president, Daniel Arap Moi, was the leader of the KADU at the time. In 1986 he said the offer had been accepted because among other things ‘Mzee Jomo Kenyatta was very insistent’ (Moi 1986: 15). In Tanzania, the opposition was outlawed immediately after the first elections, which were won by an overwhelming majority by TANU. Thereafter, former opposition leaders were either given low-ranking administrative jobs in hardship areas, kept under surveillance or, when they challenged the system, detained or exiled (Mlimuka and Kabudi 1985). These are just a few examples which point to the endemic totalitarian nature of the parties that took over the colonial machinery in Africa, preserved it as it was and used it systematically to marginalize their people.
A third methodological issue is how economic and political trends in Africa should be categorized: on the basis of geographical divisions (East, West, Central and Southern Africa); or on their colonial background (for example, French, British, Belgian, Portuguese)? Or do economic and political trends in Africa defy such categorization? The second categorization may be the easiest to contest when one considers that Liberia and Ethiopia experienced only brief periods of colonial domination. In addition, post-independence patterns in the Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya have been similar although their colonial backgrounds differ. The colonial approach is also questionable on account of the fact that since 1960 most African countries have been exposed to the international environment. Their colonial past has had an important influence on the form, level and intensity of their exposure, but this has certainly not been the only,. or in some cases decisive, factor.
On the other hand, a geographical division is also unconvincing as there are countries in East and West Africa that display economic and political commonalities without sharing borders or historical backgrounds. It is impossible to group African countries into regions for an analysis of economic or political developments, as for instance is possible in Asia. Neighbouring countries within a region can have radically opposed political systems (for example, Togo and Benin) or widely diverging patterns of economic development or performance (for instance, Botswana and Zambia).
A major underlying reason for the persistent attempts to find an acceptable regional categorization for countries that display similar political or economic problems or patterns of development is the fact that remedial strategies most often can be successful, or cost-efficient, only when they are implemented at a (sub-) regional level. Most African countries, however, were colonized individually. Even within those colonized by the same power, each colonial government pursued a different economic policy. Kenya, for example, was differently developed as a colony from the neighbouring British colony of Uganda. Similar divergences can be observed in Central and West African colonial history. Moreover, after attaining independence, most countries have continued to act on their own.
A cautious multi-level and holistic approach is necessary in the study of Africa. Where a shared common background and geographical access to common resources, or lack of access to certain factors, produces common political and economic regimes, similarities sl~culd be identified. Where similar political and economic trends are identifiable irrespective of colonial background, their causes should be investigated, and used to identify possible future trends. The only reliable method which one could easily trust without too many risks is the historical method, and it is this method that we shall rely on most.
It is difficult to understand the current political situation without reflecting on the past. Most studies concentrate on political reforms, while the first important question is what caused the problems that are now being redressed. Both general and specific case studies (Ergas 1987; Rothchild and Chazan 1988; Turner and Young 1985) mostly limit the period under review in their studies to the emergence of the post-colonial state and end up with the deterioration of this state into a ‘vampire’ or ‘prebendal’ state. The deeper historical roots are rarely addressed even though the roots of African political decay should be traced first within the decolonization process and only then in the post-colonial context.
Common trends in political decay
As many authors have noted, African politics began with a lot of hope. The hope of
independence and the capability of people to govern themselves has been crucial in the
mobilization process. The first free elections were characterized by long queues, and
parliaments were respected in those early days. But elections became more and more
meaningless even in countries which did not experience direct dictatorship.
Voting in elections declined over the years until the average percentage of voters dwindled to 20 per cent in many countries (Hayward 1987). The declining voter turnout was a first sign that the political process had become either meaningless or the restricted domain of vested dominant interests. Poverty also squeezed the majority of urban people out of the political process as they had to devote increasingly more time and attention to the search for a livelihood.
The second sign of political deterioration was that most leaders, irrespective of whether they came to power through ballots or bullets, soon acquired the legislative power either to pass decrees or to block parliamentary decisions and bills. Thus, the locus of decision making in the majority of African countries shifted away from the elected assemblies to the arena of closed circuits, state commissions, cabinet secretariats and presidential advisory bodies. At the ministerial level, principles of collective responsibility were gradually abandoned in favour of personal answerability to the president and parliamentary compliance with presidential prerogatives (Collier 1982; Jackson 1982).
The third symptom of political decay and the advance of authoritarianism was the way in which the state began using its power to control production and distribution. In most African countries a large public sector was quickly established, not only as a bulwark against the dissipation of state influence and possible demands for accountability likely to arise in an economy that developed a sizeable autonomous dynamic private sector — but also as a source of accumulation and as an instrument of patronage (through employment, recruitment of political followers and a controlled welfare system of benefits and services to loyal workers). This development went hand-in-hand with the annexation of all popular movements to the state apparatus in order to ensure that all political processes were linked to the official machinery. As one author concluded, authoritarianism can only succeed if it is built into the systems of production and decision making (Thomas 1984: 83—6).
Thus, African states designed labour regimes which were corporatist in nature. A common characteristic of these regimes was the licensing of political rights, achieved through the incorporation of all mass movements into the official machinery of the nation state. Trade unions, cooperative movements, youth bodies, chambers of commerce, religious bodies and other similar organizations in Ghana, Congo, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Zambia, for example, were only allowed to operate if they were registered under the official political parties of those countries.
In the organization of production, these bodies were all dependent on a large public sector to which other sectors were subordinated. In the regulation of distribution, they relied on rigid price and wage policies. Bargaining processes were organized on the principle of state mediation. In the case of peasants the intermediaries which fixed prices and marketed produce were the crop authorities. In the case of formal-sector workers, distribution was regulated through rigid wages boards, ministerial labour tribunals, cabinet secretariats and presidential decrees.
Such labour regimes held few growth-conducive incentives for producers. While attempts were made to reduce existing income disparities between groups, little effort was made to increase incomes for any or all groups. Distributional priorities prevailed over growth considerations. To further the distribution policies, the social welfare function of the state was centralized in many if not all regimes. Since the nerve-centre of political activity was the urban sector, the primary locus of the welfare function became the public sector. The instrument of intervention was employment, and wages policies and compulsory arbitration structures became the major distributive mechanisms.
A fourth symptom of political decay in Africa has been the concentration of power. Apart from the annexation of enterprise systems and social and political movements to the state, the state itself became a consolidated unit of power. Sometimes a complete reversal of the concept of the separation of powers was attained, not only by ensuring that the presidency, party and parliament were controlled by one person, but also by making sure that the judiciary and the civil service were either nonentities or part of the technocracy.
State terror, the fifth symptom of Africa’s political decay, has become a persistent feature of authoritarian regimes. The abuse of citizens through detention and torture, cruel degrading treatment of offenders and suspected offenders, and collective punishment have become characteristics of African state terror. The judicial systems have been allowed to decline, and people have been known to remain in custody without trial for years or to be sentenced without trial. Mass trials are organized in some countries or trials are held hastily to make space in remand prisons for new suspects. In many countries the invasion of privacy in homes and offices is sanctioned by law and freedom of expression or political participation has been restricted for decades. Discrimination on ethnic, religious and political grounds is rife in many states.
The abuse of organizational and participatory rights has affected trade unions disproportionately. The list of abuses of labour rights inflicted on the unions by African governments is long. The arbitrary reorganization or dissolution of unions, unlawful detention of union leaders, outlawing of lawful strike activities, suspension of collective bargaining and its replacement by presidential wage-setting practices, dismissal of striking workers and the imposition of severe sentences on labour organizers are but a few examples (ICFTU annual reports).
The historical roots of authoritarianism
Some of Africa’s political movements were already authoritarian and undemocratic
prior to independence. In most instances the populist parties allied to the peasants and
workers found themselves competing for power with middle-class elitist parties that allied
themselves with the colonial authorities. Most populist parties could not understand why
fellow Africans were organizing against them and allying themselves with the colonial
administration. Their lack of clarity about the world system and class alliances forced
nationalist movements to adopt authoritarian tactics of organization and mobilization.
Consequently they used youth wings to harass, boo and jeer opponents. In some cases they
burned and destroyed the property of their opponents. These practices were very common in
Kenya, Ghana, Malawi, Swaziland and Tanzania.
In some countries nationalist movements were put on the defensive by the colonial regimes. In Angola, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe the nationalist movements were outlawed and had no choice but to take up arms. Due to intimidation and penetration, they were forced to adopt tough codes of discipline and good conduct, to screen membership and to organize on rigorous lines of loyalty and obedience. Such norms, though indispensable to military discipline and cohesion, are not conducive to party democracy. The bases of participatory democracy and acceptance of the rights of others to organize were therefore easily undermined in these countries by this culture of military discipline. It is ironic that some of the movements once kept out by earlier regimes now find it difficult to tolerate political dissidence.
In most African countries, however, the independence parties initially enjoyed a lot of support and popularity. They were regarded as liberators and their leaders acquired a ‘father of the nation’ image, were invited to rule for life and given a mandate to outlaw the opposition. This was the case in countries such as the Central African Republic, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia. The leaders were quick to capitalize on this goodwill by installing one-party systems, centralizing authority, weakening accountability and in some cases declaring themselves leaders for life. Even when the euphoria of Independence began to wear off, they continued to cherish their father-of-the-nation image and, in some cases, even changed the names of their parties to give them a liberation orientation. An example is Tanzania where in 1977 TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) dissolved itself and adopted the name Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Party for Revolution — CCM).
Authoritarianism was also consolidated by many other factors, the first of which was populism. Populist regimes in Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe concentrated on retaining legitimacy and mobilizing mass support. Without offering alternatives to the poor, they sought to please the masses by controlling or taking away from the rich. This led to a wave of nationalizations of private property including private houses, the outlawing of private trading in rural areas (Congo, Ethiopia, Tanzania), the taking over of private schools, villagization and land confiscation, among other measures. All these actions were taken to secure the support of the masses for the continuation in power of the ruling parties.
Related to this was an attempt by populist regimes to prevent the emergence of strong social groupings. In Benin, Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Tanzania, Togo and Zambia for example, all social movements were annexed to the official state and party machinery. Social competition was channelled and regulated, while professional organizations were either weakened or completely outlawed. In all these countries popular participation was allowed only through the established machinery at village, community or enterprise level. Such a system could only produce undercurrents of resentment and protest. It became necessary then to have a big~ strong and sophisticated security system under which the majority of people were spying on each other. The less popular the regimes became, the more their dependence on intelligence and security services increased.
In populist and outrightly repressive regimes, the factors that led to authoritarianism and state terror were similar. The main motive was legitimacy and continued control over power, production and distribution processes. This could be secured through total control of the population and the illegitimization of the opposition. The explanations for terror and repression differed between countries. While the populist regimes claimed that control was necessary to prevent the emergence of capitalism, which was likened to colonialism, outrightly repressive regimes claimed that terror and authoritarianism were necessary to prevent the rise of communism. While the populists claimed to be socialists and the others claimed to be capitalists, both were nothing more than repressive, undemocratic, unparticipatory and unaccountable regimes.
Emerging political systems
The political change that swept over Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s took two
major forms. In a number of francophone countries, national assemblies were constituted,
bringing together social and political groups, including trade unions, to discuss how to
proceed. Benin was the first to adopt this style. Here, a national conference led to a
transitional government and multiparty elections. In other cases the ruling elite managed
to use this national gathering to stall progress, as happened in Togo, Gabon, the Côte
d’Ivoire, Niger and Zaire. In the words of one observer: ‘The entrenched
authoritarian regimes easily find time and space to frustrate the planned meeting and
derail the process’ (Medhanie 1992: 6).
A different route was adopted in a number of anglophone countries. Multiparty politics were allowed, albeit sometimes hesitantly (Kenya, Malawi, Zambia). Subsequently, elections were called, sometimes overnight (Kenya), sometimes announced in advance (Zambia). This approach was not exclusively confined to the anglophone African countries; elections were held in Angola, Mauritania, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire and Cape Verde. Mali had multiparty elections in 1992 won by the opposition Alliance for Democracy in Mali. However, in most cases, opposition parties complained about poor access to the state-controlled media and the lack of preparatory time to build a strong organization.
In order to decide whether Africa’s political systems are changing or not, one has to formulate clear quantitative and qualitative indicators. Quantitatively, the mere fact that in Angola 11 parties contested the election in 1992, that in Tanzania there are 16 parties awaiting the elections in 1995, and that in Kenya seven major parties participated in the December 1992 elections, all show that change is taking place. Equally significant is the fact that political parties have come into existence in former military regimes such as Benin, Burkina Faso, Congo and Zaire.
From a qualitative standpoint, a few questions arise. For instance, why did the United Independence Party and its leader Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia lose the elections? The return of Jerry Rawlings in Ghana by a landslide victory in 1992 surprised everyone — the opposition, the observers who had certified the elections as ‘fair’ and ‘free’, and Rawlings himself who had expected to win but not by such a large margin. Equally surprising was the return of Daniel Arap Moi and KANU in Kenya, after 15 cabinet ministers lost their parliamentary seats and the party lost many constituencies in the dominantly Kikuyu Central Province. The decision of UNITA in Angola to go back to full-scale civil war in December 1992 after a free and fair election in which its rival, the MPLA, was returned to power, shows how frustration could lead to irrational action when expectations are not met.
The emerging political trends in Africa are a continuation of African history. Repression was an economic and political factor. It was, and still is, supported by economic backwardness which provides the opportunity for dominant forces to control information, shape popular outlook and get the population to trust the elite. When ‘their leaders’ come back and apologize for past wrongs and make promises, especially when elections are preceded by infrastructural projects in key areas, the people are induced to give them another chance. Among the rural people the saying ‘Better the devil you know’ still works. Most politicians in the old parties have retained their rural roots and are promoted by the rural elite who have benefited from the politicians’ favour. Hence they are popular in rural areas and less trusted in the urban areas.
In Zambia, the situation was different. The victory of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in 1991 was possible mainly because Kaunda and the UNIP had neglected the rural areas in favour of the urban areas. It was in the urban areas that all the best schools, hospitals, dispensaries, water and other facilities existed. Life in urban areas was highly subsidized. It was the urban people who kept UNIP in power. When the state was unable to keep the urban welfare system running, and when in 1988 Kaunda initiated plans to repatriate the urban unemployed, the tide turned against the government. The MMD succeeded mainly because it took control of the urban areas and at the same time mobilized the rural areas ignored by the government.
The importance of the rural sector in current African politics was shown in Ghana. Beginning in 1989, Jerry Rawlings began a massive plan of rehabilitating rural infrastructure — roads, schools and trading centres. He also liberalized primary-commodity marketing systems, enabling peasants to sell their cocoa to many competing buyers. By the time the elections came round, the peasants had been won over by the state and they voted for the National Democratic Congress and Rawlings. A similar development occurred in Kenya. In the Rift Valley, the members of Moi’s tribe, Kalenjin, were categorically told that voting for the opposition would mean voting for a takeover of their land. The elections were preceded by intimidation of Kikuyus living in the region. Some who showed signs of opposing the government were killed and their property was destroyed. Seventeen KANU candidates were returned unopposed in the region.
In Tanzania, while the opposition has succeeded in attracting membership in urban areas, the ruling party, CCM, has increased its membership by 20 per cent in regions inhabited by poor and middle-income peasants, mainly central and south-eastern Tanzania. In the cash crop areas of the north and south-west, in which middle- and upper-income peasants predominate, the struggle between the CCM and the new Chama Cha Maendeleo na Demokrasi centres on the cooperative movement. The latter is struggling to form a splinter union of cooperative movements, and to mobilize all the cooperative movement leaders against the ruling party; the former is struggling to retain control over the leadership of the movement by in2reasing credit and rehabilitating infrastructure. Therefore, apart from the issue of the territorial union which will feature predominantly in Zanzibar, the 1995 elections in Tanzania will be won by the party or parties that have a strong influence in the rural areas.
Most of the current regimes in Africa came to power prior to the implementation of structural adjustment programmes. Some were in power when the economic climate was at its most favourable and managed to deliver some basic
Part 3: Section 8A
| TOC -- Preface | Introduction | Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | |
|
|