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La'o Hamutuk Asks for Improved UN
Role in Timor-Leste
Press release: June 26, 2006
Contact: Charles Scheiner,
charlie@laohamutuk.org, +1-914-831-1098
(USA) or info@laohamutuk.org, +670-3325013 (Dili)
The Dili-based Institute for Reconstruction Monitoring and Analysis is proposing an
expanded and extended United Nations mission in Timor-Leste (East Timor), beginning
shortly and lasting several years. In a detailed memorandum to UN staff and Security
Council members, the Institute (known in Tetum as La’o Hamutuk) draws on six years
experience monitoring UN activities in Timor-Leste to urge “that both the quality as
well as the duration of the international presence there be evaluated and improved.”
The 11-page paper, appended below, recommends that all UN activities in Timor-Leste be
in cooperation with the sovereign Timor-Leste government. The memo was sent prior to
the resignation of the Prime Minister, but it addresses longer-term concerns:
« Foreign security forces in Timor-Leste, including Australian military and
police, must be under coordinated UN command.
« Previous UN missions were too short and inadequately consulted Timorese
officials and civil society. The new mission should last at least five years, learn
from past UN mistakes, and overcome UN structural and institutional constraints.
« This mission should address the deep-seated causes of the current crisis:
massive unemployment, limited popular confidence in democratic processes and the rule
of law, traumatization, and inadequate skills and experience in state institutions and
personnel.
« Prevailing impunity for crimes against humanity committed during the Indonesian
occupation adds to the current crisis because new perpetrators expect to evade
accountability and victims take justice into their own hands. The UN must renew efforts
to end impunity, restore effectiveness to and confidence in the Timorese judicial
system, and exemplify accountability and transparency in its own operations in Timor-Leste.
« The role of the Timor-Leste military (F-FDTL) was poorly thought through during
the transitional government, and ill-conceived international training and arms supplies
have exacerbated current problems. The upcoming UN investigation of violent incidents
of April 28 and May 25 should be comprehensive and its report made public. In addition,
the UN should encourage a broad-based, national discussion to help Timor-Leste
determine what local security forces are appropriate. In the meantime, the UN and other
international supporters must train police and military forces in human rights, the
rule of law, command structures, and how to interact with the civilian population.
« The “bubble economy” created by UNTAET should have done more to jump-start local
economic development by hiring more Timorese staff and purchasing locally-produced
supplies and services. The next UN Mission must give attention to the consequences of
unemployment and alienation, and work with the Timorese government to expand
public-sector employment and effectively train Timorese managers.
« The next mission should involve more women at every level, as required by UN
resolutions. Nearly all of those directly responsible for the current crisis in Timor-Leste
are male, but women and children suffer the burden of displacement from their homes.
« The UN’s responsibility does not end with the 2007 elections, and its civic
education programs should involve more than training in election procedures. The next
UN mission should help expand awareness that healthy, informed political debate,
focused on issues and conducted respectfully and nonviolently, is an essential part of
democracy.
La’o Hamutuk’s memorandum concluded:
“Timor-Leste began with handicaps…. The millennium’s first new nation was a “poster
child” for successful (albeit belated) international intervention, but it has also been
a guinea pig and training ground for experimental projects by the UN and other
multilateral institutions. We hope that the current crisis is a wake-up call for both
the international community and the Timorese leadership, and that the next UN mission
in this country will prioritize the long-term needs of the million people who live in
Timor-Leste, .. to support their efforts to live in stability, democracy and peace.”
Background
After 24 years of illegal Indonesian military occupation, which killed more than
100,000 Timor-Leste people, the international community became involved in Timor-Leste.
On August 30, 1999, more than 78% of the people voted for independence in a
UN-conducted referendum amidst a campaign of terror and destruction by the Indonesian
military and the militia they directed. Following the vote, Indonesian-controlled
forces killed more than 1,000 people, destroyed 75% of the country’s buildings, and
displaced three-fourths of the population before withdrawing from the country.
There have been four UN Missions in Timor-Leste: UNAMET (conducting the referendum),
UNTAET (1999-2002, transitional government), UNMISET (2002-5, support), and UNOTIL (May
2005-present). With the breakdown of civil order and threats to constitutional
government during the past few months, the UN Security Council extended UNOTIL to allow
time to design a new mission. Since Timor-Leste’s independence, major powers, including
the United States and Australia, pressed for rapid termination of UNTAET and UNMISET,
but a revised consensus is likely to give the new mission a broader mandate and longer
duration than UNMISET or UNOTIL.
A UN Assessment team, headed by Ian Martin, is now in Timor-Leste and is expected to
report to the Security Council on August 7. La’o Hamutuk has given its memorandum to
that team to help their work. The Security Council has until UNOTIL’s current
expiration on August 20 to authorize the new mission.
La’o Hamutuk (“Walking Together”) is an independent Timor-Leste non-governmental
organization formed in 2000 to monitor and analyze the activities of international
organizations in the country, and to improve communications and understanding between
civil society and international institutions operating there. The institute has issued
numerous reports and radio broadcasts in Indonesian, English and Tetum with the goal of
helping the new nation achieve stability, the rule of law, and economic and social
justice. This memorandum is based on dozens of La’o Hamutuk investigations, referenced
in the memorandum and available at
http://www.laohamutuk.org
Fully referenced text and pdf version, also available at
http://www.laohamutuk.org/reports/UN/06LHSuggestUN.html
Suggestions for the Next United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste
by Charles Scheiner
Timor-Leste Institute for Reconstruction Monitoring and Analysis[*]
22 June 2006
The Timor-Leste Institute for Reconstruction Monitoring and Analysis (La’o Hamutuk)
has, together with others in Timor-Leste civil society, closely monitored and reported
on activities of international institutions in Timor-Leste, including the United
Nations, for the past six years. During this time, we have identified numerous problems
with the mandates and operation of UNTAET, UNMISET and UNOTIL and have made many
recommendations. We are informed and independent analysts, both Timorese and
non-Timorese, based in Timor-Leste but without financial or official links to the UN or
other international institutions. We believe this enables us to monitor independently
and to have a broader view than many people within the UN system or development
industry. As such, we have identified lessons not often noted by those constrained by
organizational or cultural limitations.
This memorandum does not provide a comprehensive analysis or set of recommendations for
how future international involvement in Timor-Leste should be designed. Rather, it
discusses several vital or controversial issues that must be taken into account to
improve the next UN Mission and ensure that it best serves the needs of the people of
Timor-Leste. We hope that it is a helpful contribution to the debate, and look forward
to ongoing dialogue and discussion.
Sovereignty and respect
Many diplomats over the last few weeks have referred to Timor-Leste as a “child” of the
international community or the United Nations. Although we agree that the international
community should continue to assist Timor-Leste’s development as a sovereign member of
the community of nations, we caution against the intrinsic paternalism of the
parent-child analogy and relationship. As in human parenting, support for
nation-building should heed Kahlil Gibran’s advice to respect “their own thoughts” and
“seek not to make them like you.”[1] In addition to recognizing the
sovereignty of Timor-Leste’s government, the international community should heed the
needs and desires of its people.
We are particularly troubled by Australia’s desire for exceptional status in the
international community’s involvement in Timor-Leste. Australia’s government repeatedly
demonstrated its lack of respect for Timor-Leste’s sovereign rights and the rule of law
during negotiations over Timor Sea oil and gas reserves. More recently, Australia sent
inappropriately trained soldiers and has only reluctantly coordinated its security
personnel with other international contributors, preferring that they be under
Australia’s direct command. The Australian government has suggested that an Australian
officer take control of Timor-Leste’s national police for the foreseeable future. The
United Nations must not endorse or accept involvement by Australia or any other nation
except as a full partner in a multilateral United Nations force, under UN command.
During the past two weeks, we have received many reports of arrogant or racist actions
by Australian military personnel in Timor-Leste. They have detained a prominent
Timorese journalist, repeatedly slandered Timor-Leste’s elected leaders, and abused
alleged “Lorosa’e” people. In addition to failing to stop house burnings and other
violence, Australian soldiers have aggressively broken into homes and terrorized their
occupants, including Cuban doctors. Many in Australia’s mainstream media vindictively
attack Timor-Leste’s Prime Minister, and decisions from Canberra reflect the bias which
this creates among Australian citizens, soldiers and political leaders. If Timor-Leste
is anyone’s “child,” it needs protection from this abusive would-be foster father who
lives next door. There can be no excuse for allowing Australian soldiers or police to
have a different command structure than other UN and international military, police and
civilian personnel in Timor-Leste.
For the last four years, the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste has been an
independent, sovereign member of the community of nations. Consequently, any action by
the United Nations or the international community in Timor-Leste must be undertaken
with the cooperation of the legitimate government of that nation. Under Timor-Leste’s
Constitution, government officials and institutions continue to carry out their legal
roles and responsibilities. The UN and other international agencies present in Timor-Leste
must respect the decisions of that government, and coordinate with it at the national
and District levels, as well as with other Timorese institutions. The legitimacy of the
RDTL government does not evaporate because of rumors, allegations, vituperative
slander, or paramilitary opposition.
However, if in the future Timor-Leste’s government should lose its capacity to function
or if the RDTL Constitution should be rendered ineffective by illegal or violent means,
the United Nations must not become paralyzed. Rather, it should act in the interests of
the people of Timor-Leste, providing humanitarian assistance, protecting human rights,
and assisting in the restoration of peaceful, democratic rule. Timor-Leste is far from
this point and we hope will never descend to it, but the UN should ensure that neither
Australia nor any other domestic or foreign actor is allowed to subvert Timor-Leste’s
sovereignty and constitutional democracy.
Staying the course
Currently, there is widespread consensus that the United Nations withdrew from Timor-Leste
prematurely. Many now understand that nation-building is difficult and takes time, and
cannot be rushed or aborted to meet financial or political desires of Security Council
member states.
As the UN prepares to re-engage in Timor-Leste, it is crucial that the quality as well
as the duration of the international presence there be evaluated and improved. If
UNTAET[2] and UNMISET[3] had lasted twice as many
years, but used the same methods, personnel, projects and priorities, Timor-Leste might
well have evolved into a crisis similar to the present one.
Over the last six years, the UN and other international institutions have learned much
about nation-building. Timor-Leste, as the first sovereign transitional government
undertaken by the United Nations, experienced many trial-and-error experiments. The
people of Timor-Leste endured the consequences of a learning process which may benefit
citizens of other emerging nations. Both the Timorese and the international community
can gain some small satisfaction that there will now be a second chance. We hope that
lessons learned since 1999 will be applied in Timor-Leste this time – but even more we
urge the United Nations and other international participants in this process to think
outside the box and to make every effort not to repeat mistakes which stem from
structural or political limitations of United Nations Missions.[4]
This time, let’s get it right!
In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security [
http://www.peacewomen.org/ ]. This recognizes
the unique consequences of armed conflict on women, and the benefits of increased
participation by women in peacekeeping, other UN operations and decision-making. As the
UN designs its next mission in Timor-Leste, a gender perspective is essential, with
more women involved at every level than there were in UNTAET, UNMISET and UNOTIL.
Although nearly all of those directly responsible for the current crisis in Timor-Leste
are male, women and children are suffering the main burden of displacement from their
homes.
The next UN mission is being designed in an emergency atmosphere. Although immediate
humanitarian and security concerns must be dealt with, there are deeper-seated causes
of the current problems, and crises will recur if they are not addressed. We hope that
the UN will find ways to attend to these – economic development, broad civic education,
trauma recovery, transparency, capacity-building and justice – in comprehensive and
effective ways. As in UNTAET, security and emergency relief can be dealt with
relatively quickly, but these more difficult issues should be the main foci of UN
activities in Timor-Leste for the next several years.
The resurrected UN mission should be planned to last five years or more. Although
international facilitation and support for the 2007 elections is important, the
responsibility of the international community must not end with democratic, free and
fair elections and the installation of the elected government. These are steps in the
journey toward stability and constitutional democracy, not the final destination.
Over the past six years, UN Missions in Timor-Leste have been authorized one year or
less at a time, with much frenetic attention given at the end of each period to the
mission’s renewal or transformation to its next incarnation. This process wastes
valuable political and human energy and removes many of the best international
personnel from Timor-Leste. As contracts near their end, UN staff and Volunteers begin
looking for their next postings; the most capable and experienced people will find new
jobs. The current month-by-month extension is the most vivid example of this problem
that has plagued Timor-Leste since 2001. We strongly encourage the Security Council to
give the new mission a mandate of at least two years, with a presumption of renewal
rather than of termination when the time is up. The recent extension of MINUSTAH in
Haiti[5] contains the phrase “with the intention to renew for further
periods,” and a similar intention could be expressed for Timor-Leste if the Security
Council is unwilling to authorize a mission longer than two years at this time.
Justice
It is widely recognized that the government of Indonesia, the international community,
and the government of Timor-Leste have failed to secure justice for crimes against
humanity and other serious crimes committed during the 24-year illegal occupation of
Timor-Leste by Indonesia, or even the small percentage of those crimes committed during
the UN presence in 1999. This memo will not describe the prevailing impunity or the
deep frustration felt by victims of these crimes over the lack of accountability. This
has been well documented by many qualified observers, including in the reports of the
UN Commission of Experts [
http://www.etan.org/etanpdf/pdf3/N0542617.pdf ] [6] and Timor-Leste’s
Commission for Truth, Reception and Reconciliation (CAVR) [
http://www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm
].[7] The CAVR’s Final Report describes the legacy of the lack of
justice for years of human rights violations: “Impunity has become entrenched” and
“Respect for the rule of law and the organs of the state responsible for its
administration, a fundamental pillar of … nation building in Timor-Leste, will always
be extremely fragile in this context.”
We concur and add that the repeated advocacy of “reconciliation” and “amnesty” by
President Xanana Gusmão and other Timor-Leste leaders exacerbates this situation.
However, most Timor-Leste leaders remember 24 years of serious crimes committed against
their people, when the international community turned a deaf ear to their cries for
help. We should not be surprised that Timor-Leste feels unable to single-handedly take
up the burden for prosecuting crimes against humanity committed by Indonesian nationals
acting on behalf of the Indonesian government. The international community has an
unfinished obligation, and the primary responsibility should rest with the United
Nations and not be left to RDTL’s government. These were, after all, crimes against
humanity.
Over the last few months, two consequences of the failure to provide justice have
become manifest: perpetrators anticipate impunity for serious crimes, and victims,
lacking confidence that the justice system will do its job, take matters into their own
hands. The frequent inability of Timor-Leste’s court system to deal with recent crimes
is an obstacle, but the abandonment of justice responsibilities by UNTAET and its
successors is the larger problem, and both should be addressed by the next UN Mission.
Reconstructing the police force will deal with only part of Timor-Leste’s security
deficit. Until there is widespread confidence in the judicial system and the rule of
law, Timor-Leste’s peaceful and constitutional government will remain in danger, as
some will resort to illegal or extra-constitutional processes to gain property or
power.
In addition to securing justice and establishing the rule of law for past and current
crimes, the United Nations itself should set a better example. Status of Mission
Agreements for UNTAET and UNMISET, which secretly granted UN personnel and contractors
immunity from Timor-Leste laws, should not be perpetuated. The UN must commit itself to
follow Timor-Leste’s laws and to break the pattern exemplified by the UNTAET-approved
illegal tax exemption given to the Amos W floating hotel[8] and the
lack of public accountability and transparency for violent demonstrations and police
killings in Dili on 4 December 2002.[9] Timor-Leste’s government has
also failed to publish its findings about this incident, but the United Nations should
fulfill its responsibility to transparency, because UN police were largely responsible
for PNTL at that time. One legacy of the lack of information and accountability for 4
December is that people have little faith in the commissions formed by the RDTL
government to investigate charges of discrimination within F-FDTL and the events of 29
April. The new international commission researching the April and May violent incidents
must set a better precedent.
Security forces
The design and creation of the Falintil-FDTL military force during UNTAET were heavily
influenced by the Kings College study and other international advice. Among the major
considerations were providing dignified employment to FALINTIL veterans and deterring
militia incursions from West Timor. In 1999, this latter concern had caused the CNRT to
abandon its view that Timor-Leste did not need a military force, opting instead for an
army and future navy to provide external security. However, the border with West Timor
was to remain under police jurisdiction, provided that Indonesia also demilitarized the
border.
Since Indonesia has officially accepted Timor-Leste’s sovereignty and most of the
Indonesian military is increasingly under government control, Timor-Leste’s
reconciliation efforts with Jakarta have substantially reduced the security threat from
the north or west. Any threat from Timor-Leste’s other neighbor, Australia, will be
dealt with by diplomacy rather than military combat. Hence the F-FDTL, with no clear
purpose and no apparent enemies, is left looking for something to do, resenting the
clearer mission and greater resources of the police, creating intelligence units to
find enemies, and occasionally taking on unauthorized or unconstitutional internal
security functions. Short-term decisions made by UNTAET, CNRT, and the Constituent
Assembly may have contributed to a long-term nightmare.[10]
Many F-FDTL soldiers, including all of its higher-level officers, developed their
military experience as part of the underground guerilla resistance during the
Indonesian occupation. As such, they are used to taking initiative in a
highly-decentralized structure, operating secretly and independently, distributing
weapons clandestinely from black-market sources. Distinctions between soldiers and
civilians were blurred, as individuals alternated between the armed resistance and the
civilian underground, often assuming multiple roles. Although these tactics and skills
are essential for a guerilla resistance, they are anathema to a defense force commanded
by an elected civilian government. As new recruits without guerilla experience are
added to the force, the intrinsic contradictions become increasingly unstable.
During the last few years, F-FDTL has received training and weapons from a variety of
international sources, but this support did not adequately address the historical and
internal inconsistencies with F-FDTL’s stated mission. Furthermore, since F-FDTL has no
constitutional role in internal security,[11] training did not
prepare them to interact with the civilian population, respect human rights, use
firearms appropriately, coordinate with PNTL or perform policing tasks. The disastrous
results became apparent on 28 April and 25 May 2006, although many informed observers
and Timorese citizens were aware of them long before. It’s a sad irony that Falintil
virtually never killed Indonesian noncombatants during 24 years of resistance to
military occupation, but after four years of independence and international training
they have turned their guns on their compatriots.
In addition to publishing a thorough report on these incidents, the RDTL government,
together with the next UN Mission and other international advisors, should give careful
thought to the role of military forces in Timor-Leste’s future. This should be planned
for the long-term, focused on the needs of the nation rather than historical inertia,
rivalries or role models. There are better ways to honor the heroes of Timor-Leste’s
liberation than preparing them to fight a war they have already won and which will
never happen again.
Some have proposed that Timor-Leste’s military include a battalion to serve on UN
peacekeeping missions in other countries. We do not believe that this makes sense at
this time, as most developing countries which lend their armies to the UN do it to
bring revenues into their government budget. Since Timor-Leste is blessed with
petroleum reserves, it does not need money from exporting its military forces.[12] Rather, their human capital is needed in Timor-Leste, and their
skills and commitment to the nation should be utilized in ways which assist the
development of Timor-Leste’s economy, infrastructure and long-term future, honor the
veterans, and provide them with employment and income.
Other suggested future roles for the F-FDTL include functions usually done by
civilians, such as public works and natural disaster relief. The continuation of Timor-Leste’s
military force, and the revision of its responsibilities, are serious decisions which
require deep discussion and consultation at all levels of society over an extended
period of time. Since most of the proposed future roles do not involve combat, training
during the discussion period can impart essential knowledge to both military and police
forces in human rights, the rule of law, command structures as well as legal and
illegal orders, and how to interact with the general population.
Lao Hamutuk has reported[13] about problems with international police
training and the difficult transfer of authority from the UN police (UNPOL) to the
Timor-Leste National Police (PNTL), which was spotlighted on 4 December 2002. Although
some of the most egregious shortcomings have since been addressed, problems remain at
both the operational and command levels. We are also concerned about paramilitary units
of the police, and inappropriate, large weapons issued to PNTL which have leaked into
the population. As with F-FDTL, clandestine habits have no place in a democracy’s
security forces.
The current crisis, including the virtual disappearance of PNTL from Dili in recent
weeks, illustrates the need for better training about its public service role and the
need for credible, independent, civilian oversight of police operations. The police
should not be turned into a political instrument at the beck and call of particular
politicians. But this does not mean it should be under a foreign commander, as
Australia has suggested. Rather, it should be run as part of the civil service, with a
professional, neutral commander acceptable to all components of Timor-Leste society.
The Interior Ministry should be kept free of politics, perhaps with an independent
oversight board similar to the advisory councils for the Petroleum Fund and other
sensitive government functions.
Economic development and capacity-building
Traditionally, sustainable economic development has not been considered part of UN
missions, but there is an unbreakable link between economic development and security.
As Dili has graphically illustrated over the past month, a society with a significant
proportion of unemployed, alienated young men can easily spin out of control if the
institutions responsible for law and order are disrupted. Sporadic riots of such people
occur occasionally even in long-established, prosperous democracies.
Much has been written about the temporary “bubble economy” created by the fraction of
UNTAET and UNMISET money that entered the Timor-Leste economy and provided employment
and supported secondary businesses. In fact, less than 1% of the money spent on these
missions paid salaries of Timor-Leste workers,[14] and the bulk of
the money received by international staff never came to Timor-Leste. Furthermore, these
administrations were among the most militarized in history, with most of their
personnel and the majority of their dollars allocated to armed forces.
As the UN increases its operations in Timor-Leste, it should use UN activities to
stimulate Timor-Leste’s nascent local economy. In the past, the UN imported many
supplies and services (food, water, printing, etc.) from overseas, foregoing the
opportunity to use money designated for Timor-Leste within the country. Priority was
given to water, electricity and communications systems to support UN operations, rather
than the nation as a whole. If more thought had been given to this, with a longer-term
rather than a crisis response orientation, Timor-Leste’s economic development would be
stronger now, as more businesses and public services jump-started with UN expenditures
would have survived the drawdown, continuing to provide jobs.
Another area where the UN and aid agencies can help is by promoting public employment.
For ideological reasons, the World Bank and other agencies have pushed Timor-Leste to
minimize the number of public-sector jobs. But since unemployment creates instability,
and since Timor-Leste’s petroleum revenues would allow it to employ significantly more
government workers, there is no logical reason not to hire the people required to
perform necessary functions, such as road construction and repair, school construction,
health care delivery, and rural electrification. When countries like the United States
experienced unemployment levels in the 1930s similar to Timor-Leste’s today, they
created the Works Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps. The UN
Mission could hire large numbers of unemployed people on temporary contracts, putting
their skills to productive use, improving their sense of participation in the society,
imparting work skills and experience, and leading to some longer-term jobs.
Timor-Leste’s government has had difficulties administering programs and projects,
partly because of inadequacies in capacity building,[15] over-zealous
anti-corruption procedures and excessive centralization. The UN could assist with
expanded public works programs by providing training and advice and by helping to
design improved, decentralized procedures.
All such activities must be undertaken in close coordination with the Timor-Leste
government, and the international civil servants and consultants who implement them
should have appropriate teaching and mentoring skills. They must be accountable to
Timor-Leste’s needs, rather than to UN organizational structures and distant
supervisors. To accomplish this, the UN needs to conduct an long-overdue review of how
it recruits, evaluates and promotes staff and volunteers.
It took UNTAET two years to realize that Transitional, not Administration, was the most
important word in their name. Now that this is understood, international advisors
should be selected for their ability to train and support local staff to do line
functions, not to carry them out in isolation. Attention must also be given to
trainers’ language skills – not only politically selected Portuguese but also
practically useful Tetum and Malay languages are important in training people whose
formal education has been in Indonesian.
Previous UN Missions have a structural weakness which is particularly damaging to
efforts to strengthen state institutions and their personnel: short-term contracts and
delays in recruiting qualified international advisors. In a stable government, it can
take a decade or more for someone to gain the skills and experience to manage a
department or project, and they learn from their superiors and co-workers throughout
this period. But in advisor-heavy Timor-Leste, mentors and advisors come and go several
times a year, without enough time to fully understand the institutions or the people
they are working with. Significant time is lost to recruitment delays, and advisors
nearing the end of their short contracts spend their last months looking for their next
assignment. There has to be a better way, and authorizing the mission for a longer
period (see above) is a prerequisite.
Civic Education and Democracy
One of the root causes of the current crisis is that neither the public, government
officials, nor politically active citizens have confidence in constitutional methods
for resolving disputes. This is not surprising, as the great majority of Timor-Leste
citizens have never lived in a functioning democracy where issues are debated and
decided legally and peacefully. Broad-based civic education is necessary not only to
teach the mechanisms of electoral processes , but to persuade the population that such
processes can be effective and serve the long-term interests of the entire society,
regardless of who wins in the short term.
The ineffectiveness of internationally-provided civic education and political party
development in Timor-Leste can be seen from the results. Political debates are
conducted ad hominem, rather than on substantive issues. Politicians attack their
adversaries’ integrity, rather than suggesting alternative policies. Dissatisfied
voters insult or give up on their elected representatives, rather than persuading them
to change their views. Political leaders are beholden to their party or patron, rather
than the electorate. Media coverage amplifies personal charges and counter-charges,
without analysis or facts to help the reader or viewer decide what is true. And when
tensions escalate, most people – journalists, police and other civil servants,
political leaders – abandon their public responsibilities to respond to personal and
family needs. These are fundamental problems, which cannot be fixed by training in
election law. But they must be addressed if Timor-Leste is to endure as a stable
nation, where human rights are respected and disputes are resolved peacefully, legally
and democratically.
As the UN works to re-establish the rule of law, it must also give attention to
developing a consciousness in both leaders and the general public that healthy
political debate, focused on issues and conducted respectfully and nonviolently, is an
essential part of democracy. Reconciliation between formerly polarized individuals and
institutions is essential, but it must incorporate compromise and common interests, not
only apology, compensation and forgiveness. And it cannot substitute for justice.
One of the contributing factors to the current crisis is the propensity of many
Timorese to panic easily, a result of decades of military atrocities leaving nearly the
entire population with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).[16] The
UN should address this problem among the larger population, both as a public health
matter and as a prerequisite for confidence in democratic processes. Communications
media – telephone, newspapers, internet, radio and television – must be improved, made
more accessible and utilized for rumor control and to disseminate complete and accurate
information. When people do not trust information from public sources, they rely on
rumor, imagination and disinformation, heightening tensions and displacement.
Conclusion
Nation-building is always difficult, and Timor-Leste began with handicaps resulting
from international criminality and deliberate ignorance prior to 1999. The millennium’s
first new nation was a “poster child” for successful (albeit belated) international
intervention, but it has also been a guinea pig and training ground for experimental
projects by the UN and other multilateral institutions. We hope that the current crisis
is a wake-up call for both the international community and the Timorese leadership, and
that the next UN mission in this country will prioritize the long-term needs of the
million people who live in Timor-Leste, overcoming institutional practices and
customary constraints to support their efforts to live in stability, democracy and
peace. This would not only support state institutions in Timor-Leste, but could provide
essential experience in successful institution-building and capacity development for
the United Nations, as the international community enters a new era of peacebuilding.
Notes
[*] The Timor-Leste Institute for Reconstruction Monitoring and Analysis, also known as
La’o Hamutuk (Walking Together) is an East Timorese non-governmental organization
which, since 2000, has monitored the activities and programs of international
institutions active in Timor-Leste. Many of its reports and publications can be found
in English and Bahasa Indonesia at
http://www.laohamutuk.org. Among other things, these reports discuss United Nations
Missions in Timor-Leste, bi- and multi-lateral assistance, international financial
institutions and Timor-Leste’s petroleum development. The Dili office contact
information is at the top of this page; in addition, La’o Hamutuk researcher Charles
Scheiner is currently reachable at P.O. Box 1182, White Plains, NY 10602 USA;
+1-914-831-1098, +1-914-473-3185 (cell) or
charlie@laohamutuk.org.
[1] “Your children are not your children. / They are the sons and daughters of Life's
longing for itself. / They come through you but not from you, / And though they are
with you, yet they belong not to you. / You may give them your love but not your
thoughts. / For they have their own thoughts. / … / You may strive to be like them, but
seek not to make them like you.” (excerpt from The Prophet by Kahlil Gibran, 1923).
[2] In May 2002, La’o Hamutuk published East Timor Faces Post-UNTAET Challenges: What
is to be done?
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2002/May/bulletinv3n4a.html#East%20Timor%20Faces
.
[3] In July 2003 La’o Hamutuk wrote to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan evaluating
UNMISET’s performance and suggesting what the UN should do after UNMISET phased out in
2004.
http://www.laohamutuk.org/misc/0307unmiset.html .
[4] As early as April 2001, many Timorese observers identified financial and
structural problems in UNTAET’s administration. La’o Hamutuk reported on budgetary
issues in
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2001/Apr/bulletinv2n1.html , highlighting how
few of the hundreds of millions of dollars spent on Timor-Leste enter the local economy
or follow Timorese priorities.
[5] S/Res. 1658 (2006), Section 1.
[6] S/2005/458. In October 2005, La’o Hamutuk wrote to SRSG Sukehiro Hasegawa
outlining the most important points relevant to “practically feasible approaches” to
justice that he, the Secretary-General and the Security Council had requested:
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Justice/05LHtoSRSG.html. We have published dozens of
articles and reports about different facets of the justice issue; see
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Justice/JusticeIndex.html for an index of those on our
website.
[7] See, for example, CAVR recommendation #7 (Justice and Truth) on page 183 of the
English CAVR Executive Summary: “the Commission concludes that the demand for justice
and accountability remains a fundamental issue in the lives of many East Timorese
people and a potential obstacle to building a democratic society based upon respect for
the rule of law and authentic reconciliation between individuals, families, communities
and nations.” La’o Hamutuk’s analysis of the CAVR recommendations are at
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2006/Apr/bulletinv7n1.html#Editorial .
[8] La’o Hamutuk, Can the Rule of Law Prevail? Pressure from UNHQ Exacerbates Amos W
Tax Controversy
http://www.laohamutuk.org/misc/02news.html , March 2002. After that article was
published, SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello decided to grant New York’s wishes, and allowed
the ship to depart without paying taxes required by UNTAET tax laws he had promulgated.
[9] La’o Hamutuk, Disorder in East Timor: The International Community Must Accept
Responsibility, December 2002,
http://www.laohamutuk.org/misc/1202unrest.html .
[10] La’o Hamutuk, An Overview of FALINTIL’S Transformation to F-FDTL and its
Implications, April 2005,
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2005/Apr/bulletinv6n1.html .
[11] RDTL Constitution [
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Justice/ConstitutionEng.pdf ], Article 146.2 (Defense
Force): “FALINTIL-FDTL shall guarantee national independence, territorial integrity and
the freedom and security of the populations against any aggression or external threat,
in respect for the constitutional order.”
[12] At present, Timor-Leste has approximately $600 million in its Petroleum Fund [
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/PetFund/05PFIndex.htm ] in the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York. Although this money is set aside to be used sustainably with the benefit
of future generations, some suggest that more of it could be spent now to establish
security for the future and invest in human development.
Optimistically, Timor-Leste could net as much as $1,000/soldier/month in UN
reimbursements for PKF; this would be less than 2% of its current revenues from oil and
gas.
[13] La’o Hamutuk has published two reports on UN support for Timor-Leste’s police:
An Assessment of the UN’s Police Mission in East Timor (February 2002)
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2002/Feb/bulletinv3n1.html#Police%20Mission ,
and
UNMISET and Internal Security in East Timor (May 2003)
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2003/May/bulletinv4n2.html .
[14] For a review of the UNTAET and related budgets in 2000-2001, see
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2001/Apr/bulletinv2n1.html . The 2002-2004
UNMISET budget is depicted in
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2003/May/bulletinv4n2.html as part of an article
on UNMISET support for security.
[15] For a discussion of problems in UNMISET support for public administration, see
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2005/Aug/bulletinv6n3.html .
[16] See La’o Hamutuk, Panic and Reality in Dili, May 2006,
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Justice/Panic/06LHFDTL.html .
Charles Scheiner
La'o Hamutuk (The East Timor Institute for Reconstruction Monitoring and Analysis)
P.O. Box 1182, White Plains, NY 10602 USA
Tel. +1-914-831-1098 or +1-914-473-3185 (mobile)
email: charlie@laohamutuk.org website:
http://www.laohamutuk.org
P.O. Box 340, Dili, Timor-Leste
Telephone: +670-3325013 or +670-7234335 (mobile)
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