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Timor Leste: A complex crisis
http://tapol.gn.apc.org/bulletin/2006/Bull183.htm#timor

On 9 July 2006 Jose Ramos Horta, the 1996 Nobel Peace Laureate, was appointed caretaker prime minister of Timor Leste. He will hold this position till elections are held later this year. Timor Leste, the world’s youngest independent state, erupted into violence in April and has been unstable ever since. On 25 May neighbouring Australia sent a peace-keeping force along with Malaysia, New Zealand and Portugal. It is not clear how long they will stay in Timor to maintain the security.

A paradigm for the media is: good news is no news and bad news is good news for the press moguls. Timor Leste shot into the headlines after the Santa Cruz bloodbath in 1991 and stayed in the spotlight until 2002. Then, reporting about Timor died down, a mere fleck in the ocean, a tiny impoverished third world country. But as soon as violence, riots, looting and arson and gunfire erupted, Timor Leste was back on the front pages.

Reporting in the international press has been quite confusing, often black-and-white and more often than not one-sided. Most reports of the violence have blamed the Prime Minister, Mari Alkatiri, who became the scapegoat, particularly in the Australian press.

As is usually the case, the truth in a matter like this is slightly more complicated. The Timor Leste crisis has resulted from more than the mistake of one man or even his entire cabinet. The crisis is also more complex than a failed state, the bad performance of an incompetent government or the failure of the international community, the UN which ruled East Timor from 1999 till 2002.

From 1976, TAPOL campaigned against gross human rights violations in East Timor, as it was then known, and also for its right to self-determination. With the withdrawal of the Indonesian army and its militias in September 1999 and the country’s move towards independence, TAPOL gradually reduced its involvement. After Indonesian troops left East Timor, a new human rights situation emerged and with independence in 2002, East Timor was re-named Timor Leste.

TAPOL staff have had occasional meetings with Timorese friends, some of them now cabinet ministers, members of parliament or highly-placed civil servants. In April a TAPOL staff member met Xanana Gusmao, the President and Jose Ramos Horta, then Foreign Minister, in Oporto. There were also discussions with key members of the presidential staff and the foreign ministry. TAPOL’s activities had switched to other regions of conflict like Aceh and West Papua. But the present situation in Timor Leste has compelled us to look at the background of the current conflict.

There are several aspects, domestic and external, which are political and economic in nature. The historic background should also be included in the analysis as the conflict has developed into a power struggle between former compatriots of different political denominations.

Some basic facts about the conflict
The conflict started with a revolt inside the FDTL (the Timorese armed forces). The split was severe and was not handled well either by the FDTL leadership or the ministry of defence. Almost half of the new recruits walked out over complaints of discrimination and poor working conditions. With around 1,500 troops, heavily armed and well trained in Australia, the US and Portugal, the FDTL became prey to political partisanship and split virtually down the middle. Six hundred men were sacked after which they revolted and retreated to the mountains carrying their weapons. The subsequent violence in the streets of Dili caused the deaths of about 30 people.

In the following weeks several demonstrations took place in Dili, demanding that Alkatiri should step down as prime minister. Tens of thousands, fearing for their lives, fled to the countryside.

Timor Leste’s recent history has been tumultuous, full of misery, bloodshed, abject poverty, and injustice. In 1975 the Indonesian armed forces invaded East Timor and conducted a bloodbath while the departure of the Indonesian army and its militia in 1999 was again the scene of mass destruction and more than a thousand killings. Although the present crisis cannot be blamed directly on Indonesia, it is nevertheless true that many Timorese still bear the trauma from the days of the Indonesian occupation. So as soon as violence erupted in Dili, more than 100,000 people fled in all directions, including to Indonesia and Australia.

Political patterns and lines of divisions soon became visible. The riots and demos, often very violent, were largely anti-government in nature. Prime Minister Alkatiri described what happened as an attempted coup d’etat and part of a destabilisation campaign. In 2005 demonstrations led by Catholic priests had also wanted Alkatiri to step down.

Then members of the military police under Major Alfredo Reinado joined the renegade soldiers, led by Major Gastao Salsinha. In interviews the rebels made the same demand: Alkatiri should step down.

Two prominent Timorese leaders President Xanana Gusmao, and Foreign Minister Jose Ramos Horta, began to play a prominent role in finding a solution to the conflict. Pressure on Alkatiri to step down intensified. Both Gusmao and Horta were formerly members of Fretilin, the ruling party in Timor Leste which won an absolute majority in parliament, 55 out of 88 seats. Mari Alkatiri and the majority of cabinet members are all prominent members of Fretilin.
In the meantime, in mid June, some 148,000 citizens of Dili were still living in 57 IDP (internally displaced persons) camps around Dili and elsewhere. International aid was flowing in from the UN and international aid organisations.

Xanana Gusmao then took a stronger position, demanding that Alkatiri should step down. In a 14-page letter to Fretilin, he explained his position. Fretilin’s dignified reply was far shorter and its members turned out in great numbers to participate in a peaceful and orderly demonstration to express support for their leaders and demand their share in the future government.

Alkatiri’s position became untenable when one of the FDTL commanders alleged that he had been assigned by Home Affairs Minister Rogerio Lobato to set up hit squads to eliminate political opponents. Alkatiri has always denied this and so far there has been no proof to support these allegations.
Mari Alkatiri resigned as Prime Minister in early July and Jose Ramos Horta was appointed to replace him on 9 July, also filling the posts of foreign affairs, home affairs and defence minister.

Assessing the situation
The burning issue is whether the attacks on Mari Alkatiri as secretary-general of Fretilin and prime minister where part of a deliberate attempt to overthrow him and his government. Fretilin won the elections in 2002 overwhelmingly under the watchful eye of the international community. Fretilin’s victory was predictable as it had been the backbone of the resistance against the Indonesian occupation since 1975. Alkatiri’s resignation was a sign the willingness of Fretilin to sacrifice its leader for the sake of finding a peaceful solution. Then Xanana basically took over political responsibility to set up a new cabinet.

It seems that the violence did not spread to other places and now, the violent attacks on people’s homes and the IDP camps have diminished.

The initial, sustained violence in April and May was a combination of political pressure to topple Alkatiri combined with rioting and looting from the disenchanted youth, mostly unemployed with few prospects of a job.

It could be argued that the takeover by Xanana Gusmao and Jose Ramos Horta is unconstitutional and therefore a coup d'etat. The Fretilin government under Alkatiri was a legitimate government, still enjoying the support of the majority until proven otherwise through elections. A concept of national unity, now propagated by Xanana Gusmao and Jose Ramos Horta, might function for a brief period to overcome the crisis but it is an illusion to regard a society as homogeneous. Societies are by definition politically plural.

In conspiracy theories, the rebellion of sections of the army against the government could be seen as the first stage of a coup d’etat, which ultimately failed. Xanana Gusmao, despite his pressure for Alkatiri to resign, was fully aware of the illegality of these move. But in the end it happened anyhow. Alkatiri left the scene but other options still remain because Fretilin is still the most powerful force in Timor Leste.

East against west
The first reports about the violence were based on the conflict within FDTL and regional sentiments between those who originate from the east, called loro sae and those from the west, commonly called loro monu. There is a grain of truth in saying that the majority of FDTL leaders are from the east. It is a fact that during the armed resistance against the Indonesian army, the major strongholds were based in the east and this tradition has continued to this day. Brig. General Taur Matan Ruak is more fluent in the eastern dialects of fataluku than the more common dialect in the west called tetum. He often address the troops in his local dialect which has created resentment. Complaints from the renegade troops about discrimination and poor working conditions have not been dealt with by the leadership. Defence Secretary Roque Rodrigues, a Fretilin leader who lived in the diaspora (Angola) is a skilful ideologue but lacks the managerial skills of a minister. The sacking of 600 men out of a force of 1500 is a prime example of mismanagement and is evidence of the lack of ability within the ministry to solve problems.

Anywhere in the world, regional differences can create tensions but in the East Timor case, the opposite took place. The brutal Indonesian occupation actually unified people from the east and the west. In the resistance both sides cooperated well and the present crisis can never be explained by this east-west division.

It should be noted that Timor Leste, as a smaller nation-state, prior to its independence, considered the option of doing without an army and relying on a police force for security and law and order. But with the abundance of vigilante groups across the border and the several thousand ex-Falintil (the armed wing of the resistance) combatants, the Timor government decided to create a defence force (FDTL).

Complexities of National Unity
Experiences in the history of other countries teach us that creating a united front is a complex matter. United or national unity fronts often fail or reflect nothing more than a front controlled by the major party. Fretilin in East Timor is by far the largest political grouping, far larger than all the other parties put together. The present power struggle between Fretilin and ex-Fretilin leaders can be traced back to the mid 80s. One can only grasp the present political crisis in Timor if we go back to the differences in interpreting national unity in the past.

From the outset Fretilin, was a national front, encompassing different political denominations. Take a look at its key founders: Jose Ramos Horta, the present prime minister, was a centrist. Others like Mari Alkatiri, Nicolau Lobato and others were more left leaning. Xavier do Amaral, the first chair of Fretilin, was more to the right. There was also a Marxist wing with people like Sahe, Carvarinho and others. Fretilin represented a revolutionary front against a fascist colonial regime in Portugal under Salazar and Caetano. Xanana Gusmao was not a member of the initial core group of leaders and emerged as leader of Fretilin after 1981. Fretilin experienced a very radical period when in 1977 the ideology of Marxism-Leninism was adopted. This happened in the most difficult period of the military offensive by the Indonesian army that decimated Fretilin's leadership.

In December 1986, an important political event occurred when Xanana Gusmao declared the establishment of CNRM, the National Council of Maubere Resistance. This new umbrella group reflected the widespread resistance all over East Timor. Xanana officially abandoned Fretilin and became the leader of the national united front of resistance. Jose Ramos Horta, who had left Fretilin even earlier, became his special representative. Falintil, the armed wing of Fretilin was converted into the national army of Timor. Xanana became an above-party leader, a unifying figure for all Timorese parties and individuals. Later CNRM changed its name into CNRT, the National Council of Timorese Resistance.

Fretilin was always part of this national unity strategy against the Indonesian occupation but prior to the elections in Timor in August 2001, Fretilin withdrew from CNRM because politically CNRM had fulfilled its purpose after the withdrawal of Indonesia. East Timor adopted a multi party system and Fretilin won the elections.

Fretilin's political dominance is huge and Timor Leste is often seen as a country governed by a single party with all the negative consequences of a one-party system, lacking the checks and balances provided by opposition parties.
In the present crisis Xanana Gusmao has (mis)used his popularity and his previous position as a supreme leader who stands above the parties. Over the years, he adopted the controversial view that Timor does not need political parties but should build a national united front. But Fretilin did not hold this opinion when it emerged the victor in the 2002 election, which left Xanana and Horta without a political constituency.

Building institutions and infrastructure
In the first years after the Indonesians left, from 1999 to 2002, the country was run by the UN. With all its flaws the UN and the other international organisations physically reconstructed Timor Leste, and established the basics of a democracy.

Looking back, two years is a very short time to build a new nation state from the ashes. The departure of the UN and the international community left a huge gap and the 'bubble economy' collapsed, creating problems for the newly elected government.

The Alkatiri government fought against all the odds and inevitably made many mistakes. They had to build a judicial system with very few law graduates, a health system with very few doctors and trained medical staff and so on. State institutions exist in Timor Leste but are still weak and often plagued with poor management and inexperience.

Government performance
Jose Ramos Horta said (Wall Street Journal 9 June 2006) a few weeks before he was appointed prime minister:

“From 2002 to 2005, events went relatively smoothly. The newly elected political leaders worked to build a functioning democratic state. With oil and gas revenues, combined with foreign assistance, East Timor's treasury collected enough money to finance its budget, which in 2006-2007 is projected to total US$240 million. Major infrastructure projects are planned for the next few years, including new roads, bridges, ports and airports. More money will also be directed toward the poor rural areas, where most of our citizens live.”
The Alkatiri government showed modest gains in several fields, particularly education and health. School enrolments rose from 59 per cent in 1999 to 66 per cent in 2004. In the health sector, Cuba despatched about 100 doctors to the countryside of Timor Leste which was more than double the 45 doctors in Timor. Cuba has also promised to increase the number of scholarships it will provide from 200 to 600.

The Alkatiri government’s fiscal conservatism was admirable as it avoided becoming a client of international finance institutions like the World Bank and IMF. Timor Leste is a debt free country and Alkatiri made a pledge to keep all natural resources in state hands. His dogged determination to make a good deal with Australia over its oil and gas reserves was admirable. Initially Australia wanted a share-out of revenues of 80 per cent for itself and 20 per cent for Timor. After two years of tough bargaining, the deal finally struck was 50-50.

On the political front, the Alkatiri government had a difficult relationship with the powerful Catholic Church. The majority of Fretilin leaders are staunch secularists and teaching religion in the state schools became a heated issue between government and church over whether religious teaching in the schools should be compulsory. It is no secret that church leaders wanted to get rid of Alkatiri. Horta is likely to start a dialogue with the church to find an accommodative stance.

A subsistence economy
Despite all the efforts of the Alkatiri government, the macro figures of the country’s economy remain bleak. In terms of GDP, Timor Leste is among the poorest in the world with US$400 per capita annual income, but its human development index is somewhat better.

Unemployment is a staggering 50 per cent and since 1999, there has been a huge population shift from countryside to town, causing a sharp increase in the population of Dili.

Unlike other parts of Asia, Timor Leste has not become part of the global economy, where manufacturing industries absorb much of the cheap labour. On the other hand Timor Leste is extremely dependent on its oil revenues and belongs to the category of countries like the Emirates or Kuwait where almost 70 per cent of state revenues comes from oil.

In general, a government is judged on in its performance in creating more wealth and income for its citizens and creating job opportunities. The Alkatiri government arguably didn’t do enough to boost the agricultural sector, in particular promoting cash crops or boosting the trade sector. The entrepreneurial middle class in Timor Leste is very weak as compared with the bustling middle classes in neighbouring Asian countries.

Many young Timorese have been forced to leave home to look for jobs abroad, in factories in Ireland, the UK or Portugal. There should be a middle way where some of the oil revenues are used to promote the private sector.

Final outcome
At the time of writing, it was too early to draw any firm conclusions. As the new premier, Horta is sure to use the oil revenues in more ‘creative’ way to attract foreign investors and offer them tax holidays. But politically Horta will have to make an accommodation with Fretilin. Ruling the country while ignoring Fretilin is an impossible task in Timor Leste. It so happens that the most senior cabinet minister from Fretilin after Alkatiri is Ana Pessoa, Horta’s ex-wife. We have to wait and see whether this makes compromises easier or more difficult.

Last but not least, one should not forget that in most cases, having an abundance of oil is more a curse than a blessing. Alkatiri adopted an independent position and was a tough negotiator in the negotiations over oil with Australia. He has created many enemies both at home and abroad. It is no secret that the US and Australia wanted to see Alkatiri sidelined, which is what happened. His domestic foes argued that Alkatiri used the oil revenues wrongly. All this gelled into a ferocious campaign against him.

Our own reading at present is that there are no signs of fundamental flaws in the way Alkatiri handled the complex conditions confronting him during his period as prime minister.

 

 

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