News Updates
The following articles have been collected through the justpeace mailing list and have been posted in this section to encourage further reflection and discussion. More articles can be found in the archive.
State-imposed national identity is not a social cure-all
The Nation, Bangkok
30 October 2004
We have been taught by our parents and by our schools to believe that we belong to the same community, known as the Thai nation state. In this state, we share the same language, culture, identity and beliefs. Our schools and our teachers told us that our country has a rich culture and history. They told us that our ancestors and our kings fought courageously, without caring for their own safety, in order to protect the nation�s territory and its sovereignty.
In school, we would be punished for speaking regional dialects. In some schools in the North, students who speak in the Northern dialect in class would be fined, as teachers would consider this to be a failure of the educational system, which emphasises the importance of the central Thai language.
We have been told that our opportunities in study, in work, and in life would be limited if we did not learn to speak the central Thai language properly. Being unable to communicate in the central Thai language � considered to be the official and national language, thus usually brings shame and humiliation to speakers of dialects.
Culturally, we have been taught to admire the beauty and uniqueness of our culture, as expressed through our national dress, arts, performance and social manners. We have learnt and remembered how to distinguish ourselves from those who don�t share the same language, culture and territory. For example, we will tell others that Thai people are easygoing by nature. Visitors to Thailand might remember generosity, kindness, gentleness and a love of fun among the major features that Thais usually characterise themselves as having.
The three things that we have been taught to value above all others are the nation, religion, and the monarchy.
To express our love of the Royal family and the nation, we have been taught to pay respect to its symbols; the national anthem and the national flag. In Thailand, we are proud to show our love for our nation twice a day � at 8am and 6pm � when the whole nation freezes for about 30 seconds to listen to the national anthem. Thanks to modern communications technology, some people now show their love of the nation by programming their cell-phone ring tone to play the national anthem.
We have been taught that Buddhism is the national religion. Buddhists, we have learnt, are tolerant, merciful and peace-loving people � a belief that has been challenged by public apathy in response to the hundreds of Thai people killed in the Thai government�s recent crackdown on suspected drugs traffickers and, now, protesters.
In most parts of the country our educational system � now under reform � that produces, promotes, and distributes what we have been learnt to be our national identity, has worked successfully, with the exception of the South.
It is in the South of Thailand, in the predominantly Muslim provinces, where the Thai state�s regime of nationalism and national identity has failed, unfortunately without the authorities� realisation. It is there that residents insist on preserving their local identities, religious beliefs and linguistic preferences. People there have long identified themselves with other identities than the Thai authorities would have preferred.
It is apparent that the Thai authorities� notion of the nation state is different from that in which some elements in the country�s southern provinces believe they live. Theirs is one identified by a shared language and religion unfamiliar to state authorities, which flies in the face of the wishes of the Thai state authorities. The rhetoric of national security usually means that anyone failing to conform with the state-defined national identity is a traitor.
Claims by military officials that they heard protesters participating in the Narathiwat incident communicating in Arabic reinforced the perception that the protesters were �others�, who don�t have �Thai� consciousness.
The authorities� failure to impose linguistic nationalism on the Muslim communities of the South has long embarrassed local authorities.
Thus, it is not surprising that Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, in his immediate reaction to the recent crackdown in Narathiwat province, addressed the importance of enforcing the centralised education system in the South, and introducing ideas of controlling the Islamic-based pondok school system.
The premier sincerely believes that the unrest in the South can be easily resolved by taming young southern people with the centralised educational system that has been applied in other regions. Then find these youngsters work after graduation, so that they don�t become involve in separatist activities.
Yet, the complexity of the situation, which is a symptom of the decades-old tension between local identities and the imposed �national identity�, requires solutions that reflect a greater understanding of the historical, political and cultural context.
MUKDAWAN SAKBOON
::: posted by cbs : 10/31/2004
Up-Date on Situation in the South of Thailand
Below is some follow-up information about the situation in Thailand following the death of 84 Thai citizens at the hands of their own security forces earlier this week.
A local Thai newspaper called Komchadluek conducted a poll of its readers asking if the deaths of the 84 Muslims was an overreaction by the government or an acceptable reaction. The results were:
1. Overreaction � 69.23% (5,171 respondents)
2. Acceptable reaction � 29.23% (2,183 respondents)
3. No opinion � 1.54% (115 respondents)
A Thai friend was in the southern province of Pattani during the tragedy. He was meeting with religious leaders from the three southern provinces discussing some of the joint peacemaking projects they are working on together. He shared the following reflection with me this morning.
I am afraid that what really happened is much worse than the worse accounts being reported. When you see a group of humans as worthless objects this is what happens. Hope is wearing thin. My own feeling now is that all the efforts of those outside the region, whether it be writing articles, organizing seminars, talking to political and military leaders, will have no effect if such activities are considered to be the main efforts of most importance. To deal with the violence the main efforts must be, and seen to be, a peace movement by those in the 3 provinces living in the middle of the violence and injustices themselves. The efforts by those outside (like us) must be to give support to such movements. As such a movement grows in number, then the state will listen and take notice. I am now trying to talk with various groups who live down South to see how I can help in the organization.
I have requested this friend to advise me on how our regional interfaith network of justpeace workers can support such a movement. I will notify you when he makes some suggestions and I hope that we can mobilize a regional movement to support the local movements for Justpeace.
A Reuters report from the area says that nearly 1,300 people were arrested. Many of those arrested were stacked in army trucks like five layers of human bricks for the five hour drive to the army detention center. They were not allowed to get up despite their pleas for help. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra admitted that the army made mistakes leading to the suffocation of the young men but described the action of security forces as �gentle measures�.
Many Thais were horrified by the events that unfolded early this week in the southern part of Thailand when Muslims and Thai security forces clashed. About 84 people were killed, more than 70 of them from suffocation after been crammed into army trucks for a three-hour drive to a military detention camp. Activities around the country to protest this horror and to call for peace are rapidly forming. Below are a few.
1. People who stand for justice and peace are being called to gather in front of the parliament building every Friday evening to hold a vigil. The leaflet calling for the vigil states in part, �We do not have representatives who speak for us so we have to raise our voices ourselves. We can not stand by and let the state use power to destroy other people in our name. How can we stay silently in a violent society? Please come to the parliament yourselves to help stop the violence.�
The leaflet further urges people to bring:
�1. A candle to help bring light to the Thai society which now lives in darkness and also to be a light of wisdom.�
�2. A piece of paper for writing a message to hang on the gates of the parliament.�
�3. A piece of black cloth for expressing sorrow over the deaths of the people on the 25th of this month.�
2. Famous folk musician Nga Caravan and other friends have formed a group called �Flowers and Paper Birds for Peace.� The aim of the group is to bring happiness and peace to the people in the south of Thailand. Their website states that they want to call �Sixty million hearts to weave a relationship with the brothers and sisters in the South by using flowers and paper birds.� They will travel around the country urging people to become involved in efforts to bring peace to the troubled area of southern Thailand.
::: posted by max : 10/29/2004
Myanmar's Costless Shift to a Hard-Line
Drafted by Dr. Michael A. Weinstein on October 27, 2004
On October 20, Prime Minister Khin Nyunt of Myanmar was removed from his position and replaced by Soe Win after an apparent power struggle within the State Peace and Development Council, the military junta that has ruled the Southeast Asian country since 1988. Under military rule, Myanmar has had one of the most reclusive regimes in the world, limiting external contacts and refusing to participate fully in the globalization project, which involves free trade and investment, privatization, and democratic institutions. Nyunt, who assumed the post of prime minister in August, 2003, was seen by the international community as a figure who might move Myanmar -- if only tentatively -- toward greater participation in the globalization framework. Win, in contrast, is a hardliner who reportedly opposes any steps toward democratization and has little, if any, concern with satisfying foreign powers.
Given that Myanmar has been under diplomatic pressure to open up and undertake democratic reform from the United States and neighboring states in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (A.S.E.A.N.), and has had economic sanctions imposed on it by the United States, the shift in leadership indicates that the military regime has decided that it does not have to submit to that pressure. Unlike other relatively isolated states, such as North Korea and Iran, Myanmar is not suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction, which places it outside the categories of "states of concern" or "rogue states."
The military regime, which has been fighting chronic wars with at least twenty insurgent ethnic groups and has been accused by human rights organizations of using prisoners as slave labor, has been able to persist without facing external military threats. Indeed, it has brisk trade relations with Thailand and China and has opened up its substantial oil resources (estimated at 3.2 billion barrels) to exploitation by British, Canadian, Australian, Malaysian, Indonesian and Chinese companies. Myanmar's experience exemplifies how a closed authoritarian regime that plays ball just enough can hold out against globalization.
Pragmatists and Hardliners
Nyunt's ouster was engineered by Senior General Than Shwe who has been Myanmar's strongman and chairman of the State Peace and Development Council since 1992. Shwe's rise to power followed parliamentary elections in 1990 that were canceled by the military after the reformist National League for Democracy (N.L.D.) won 396 seats, an assortment of minor parties took 79 seats and the pro-military National Unity Party won only ten.
Led by General Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi, the N.L.D. has gained broad international diplomatic support, but has been repressed by the military within Myanmar. Suu Kyi, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, has been under house arrest for nine of the past fifteen years. The tortuous relationship between the junta and the N.L.D. has been marked by brief periods of relaxed repression followed by clampdowns, the most recent of which followed an attack in May, 2003 mounted by supporters of the junta on an N.L.D. convoy that was touring northern Myanmar during the last period of relaxation. After the attack, reportedly organized by the new Prime Minister Win, Suu Kyi was again placed under house arrest.
International opposition to Suu Kyi's detention was reportedly responsible for the reformist gestures by Nyunt, which included in a seven-stage "road map" the convening of an assembly to restart work on a constitution for the country (the former constitution has been suspended by the junta), but did not make concessions to the N.L.D. The future of the assembly, which began work this year, is now in doubt.
The hopes of the pro-globalization sectors of the international community that Nyunt would inch Myanmar toward democratization were not only based on his road map, which was widely interpreted as in great part a symbolic move, but also on his success in negotiating cease-fire agreements with seventeen of Myanmar's approximately twenty dissident ethnic minorities, which are concentrated in the country's north. Those agreements, which are bound up with the success of the constitutional process, are also now in doubt. At present, Yangon seems to be poised to revert to its familiar pattern of military suppression of non-Burmese ethnic groups and intolerance of ethnic Burmese opposition, while attempting simultaneously to expand trade relations with its neighbors and procure aid from them for infrastructure development.
Although it is difficult to pin down the political maneuvering within Myanmar's secretive regime, analysts agree that Nyunt's downfall was the result of a power struggle between hard-line and pragmatist factions within the country's military establishment. Much narrower than the similar conflict between theocrats and reformers in Iran, the differences between Myanmar's factions hinge on tactics rather than strategy.
The pragmatists, centered in Yangon's intelligence apparatus and represented by Nyunt, believe that Myanmar's vital interests in economic development can only be met by prudent relaxation of repression and accords with ethnic minorities that in their judgment need not threaten the regime. The hardliners, concentrated in the regular army, believe that any loosening of repression will endanger the regime's hold on power and that economic development will not be threatened by the continuation of strong authoritarian measures.
Each faction represents an interpretation of the strategy of Myanmar's northern neighbor China, which pursues a policy of maintaining authoritarian rule as it pursues international economic relations, and rejects the market democracy formula of mainstream globalization. Both factions are eager for economic development -- if only to enrich the regime and blunt domestic opposition -- and both are committed to the regime's perpetuation.
The basic division between pragmatists and hardliners is complicated by their rivalry over control of border trade with Thailand and China, which provides opportunities for corruption. According to Transparency International's "Global Corruption Perceptions Index," released on October 20, Myanmar is the fourth most corrupt country on the list of 145 states, after Haiti, Bangladesh and Nigeria. Under Nyunt, the intelligence apparatus gained greater power over border security and it is not surprising that the former Prime Minister has reportedly been placed under house arrest on corruption charges.
Although an internal struggle for dominance in the junta and the spoils that go with it probably played a major role in Nyunt's replacement by Win, it is also reasonable to speculate that the hardliners were emboldened to make their move because they judged that in the current international environment they could proceed without threatening Yangon's vital interests. The partial vacuum created by the diminution of American power in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom has left all world and regional powers to fend for themselves, which means that pressure is reduced on regimes that do not cooperate fully with the globalization project. Yangon's hardliners have been able to take advantage of the more open global situation to try to preserve Myanmar's status as a relative hold out.
International Response to Yangon's Shift
Endowed with oil and gas reserves, yet impoverished and underdeveloped in great part because of regime-imposed isolation and a crony economy, Myanmar is embedded in an international force field in which the United Nations, the country's Southeast Asian neighbors (particularly Thailand), Japan and, most importantly, China are the major players. Each of these actors has interests or limitations that have prevented it from exerting sufficient pressure on Yangon to wring concessions from the junta or to threaten its existence. The responses to the political shake-up in Yangon by the organizations and states that are interested in Myanmar show the pattern that the junta counts on to make its hard-line policies successful.
Predictably, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, representing the pro-globalization tendency, called for Yangon "to remain committed to the process of national reconciliation and democratization," and to release Suu Kyi from house arrest. U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher echoed Annan, adding that the replacement of Nyunt by Win appeared to be a step in the wrong direction. The United Nations special envoy to Myanmar Razali Ismail, a Malaysian diplomat who was appointed in 2000 to mediate reconciliation between the regime and the N.L.D., also expressed regret at Nyunt's downfall. These responses simply continue a line of diplomatic pressure that is backed materially only by American sanctions and has not been successful in altering Yangon's behavior.
The case is more complex for the A.S.E.A.N. states, which have pursued a policy of "constructive engagement" with Yangon, in contrast and opposition to the U.S. sanctions policy. Sharing a long border with Myanmar, Thailand, along with Malaysia, has been the strongest advocate of constructive engagement, which involves intensive trade and investment relations with Yangon. In contrast with the U.N. and U.S. position, Thai Foreign Ministry spokesman Sihasak Phuangketkeow said that the Yangon power shift was "an internal affair of Myanmar" and expressed hope for "political stability" there.
Bangkok's economic relations with Yangon stand in the way of its pressuring the junta to embrace reform. Thai Finance Minister Somkid Jatusripitak said that the power shift in the junta would have only a small effect on border trade with Myanmar. Sataporn Jinachitra, president of Thailand's Export-Import Bank, added that the shift was unlikely to affect its credit line to Yangon for development projects, although disbursements might be delayed for a short time until the political situation stabilized. Similar statements were made by Thailand's oil and gas industry, and by the Thai satellite communications company that is helping to build Myanmar's telecommunications infrastructure. For Bangkok, Yangon's power shift means business as usual.
Japan, which is Myanmar's biggest aid donor, falls between the U.S./U.N. and Thai positions. Pursuing a security strategy of winning influence in Southeast Asia through economic aid and investment, while remaining an essential player in the globalization project, Tokyo adopted a measured approach of calling for democratization and a market economy in Myanmar, but taking a "wait and see" attitude toward the new political alignment there. Reflecting its dual interests, Tokyo announced that it would temporarily suspend all but humanitarian aid to Yangon.
Myanmar's northern neighbor China has given Yangon its strongest support. China's trade with Myanmar exceeded one billion dollars in 2003, with Myanmar importing 900 million dollars worth of Chinese goods and exporting 170 million dollars worth of goods to its neighbor. In 2004, Beijing signed thirty-three aid and trade agreements with Yangon, and in September finalized a production-sharing contract to cooperate in oil exploration. Than Shwe has repeatedly said that China is Myanmar's "most important friend" and that Yangon will side with Beijing on all issues concerning China's interests. Similarly, Beijing has promised to continue its "friendly" policy toward Yangon.
Following similar policies of what Shwe calls development "in accordance with the country's own characteristics" (rejecting the market democracy paradigm), Beijing and Yangon have a common interest in holding out against full participation in the globalization project and in continuing their drive to expand "all-round cooperation" with one another.
Conclusion
Given its oil resources and its attractiveness to regional investors, it is unlikely that Myanmar will be hurt in any serious way by a shift to a hard-line position in Yangon. The split between A.S.E.A.N. and the United States on the proper policy to encourage democratization in Myanmar leaves the United Nations without any clear direction for its reconciliation efforts. Bangkok will not surrender its economic relations with Yangon, as long as the latter honors agreements. Tokyo will not want to lose the foothold that it has in Yangon. Beijing has every interest in keeping the junta in power and preventing the emergence of a reform government in Yangon that would tilt toward mainstream globalization and would welcome American investment and influence.
It is likely that the hardliners will get away with their takeover without suffering any significant loss.
** The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of inquiries@pinr.com. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.
::: posted by max : 10/28/2004
THAILAND: Amid Violence, Muslim South Pins Hopes on New Approach
Prangtip Daorueng
BANGKOK, Apr 7 (IPS) - The graffiti on an abandoned fence in Pattani province in Thailand, near the border of Malaysia, reads, ''Is justice still out there?'' The sign is a reflection of the fear and confusion among residents of Thailand's three southernmost provinces -- Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat -- and their frustration over the government's inability to end the violence, arson, bombings and killings that Bangkok blames on separatists, but which critics question.
On Mar. 30, masked men stole a huge amount of explosives - including 1.4 tonnes of ammonium nitrate and 56 sticks of dynamite and 176 detonators - from a quarrying company in Yala, prompting the Thai government to convene emergency meetings.
In January, unidentified men stormed into an army camp in the south and killed four soldiers before taking away 400 machine guns. The government deployed more police and military forces to the area and imposed martial law, a move that heightened tensions between the government and the country's Muslim minority.
Murders, bomb explosions and kidnappings occur almost daily, and scores of government buildings and schools have been torched. Media regularly calls the region the ''troubled'' south, home to the bulk of Thai Muslims who number six million out of the country's 63 million mainly Buddhist population.
The credibility of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra hit rock bottom when a well-respected Muslim lawyer - who represented people accused of plotting a bombing spree -- disappeared in Bangkok on Mar. 12. Polls now say 85 percent of Thais rank the violence in the south as the most damaging issue for Thaksin.
This week, Bangkok-based newspapers pointed to two police colonels as being involved in what the abduction of lawyer Somchai Neelaphajiit. Activists also revealed that in the past four months, more than 100 suspected separatists in the south have been kidnapped.
Public criticism led to the change of the police chief in mid-March, but violence persists.
''Justice is very important in the eye of the Muslims,'' said Chaiwat Satha-anand, a peace activist and professor at Thammasat University and deputy chairman of the Strategic Non-violence Committee under the National Security Council.
''The fact that many people have disappeared is a big problem. As for the case of the lawyer, he himself represents justice in the eyes of many. Making him disappear means the erosion of the justice system itself,'' he added in an interview.
But the failure of the government's approach so far has led to a policy shift, one that seeks a non-violent approach as an alternative to tough security measures under the four-month-old martial law. So far, the violence has been treated as a law-and-order and security issue.
In late March, Thaksin appointed his deputy, Chaturon Chaisang, as head of a new team looking for a solution to the southern conflict. The team conducted 10 meetings in the three southern provinces, in which 1,000 community representatives took part.
Many hope this is a step in the right direction and responds to the demands of the southern communities.
Shortly after being appointed, Deputy Prime Minister Chaturon, a former member of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), urged government officials to focus on their task: the restoration of peace: ''Authorities must protect the people and establish trust among them. They must support unity among races and religions.''
What Chaturon said reflects what many in the south believe is the root of the problem. While separatist elements may have mild influence in the Muslim-majority provinces -- once a part of the Islamic kingdom of Pattani and where separatism arose in the seventies-- many have ruled out its involvement in the latest violent incidents.
Instead, they point to the state's cultural insensitivity and misconduct by the authorities, saying that they helped stir up political and criminal conflicts that now manifest themselves in violence.
Meantime, the fear of violent incidents has driven southerners to change their daily routines. The once-busy streets in the three provinces now go quiet after 7 p.m., and family and friends are busy looking out for one another's safety.
Buddhist ceremonies such as funerals, or wedding parties that used to be held at night have been moved to the day.
''Nobody knows who is doing this, but people are dying everyday,'' said Supat Boonthanom, editor of the 'Chao Thai' weekly newspaper in Yala province. ''It's like in a war zone where police and solders with guns walking around. I have worked as a journalist for 26 years, but now I cannot understand my own region anymore,'' she said.
Chaturon's team is keen to try out a conflict-resolution approach, one based on the inputs of experts that include Chaiwat, who has written papers on state and conflict resolution and security policy for the southern provinces (1999-2003). The documents focus on the acceptance of cultural differences as a means toward peace.
As a part of a seven-point plan to be submitted to the government, Chaturon envisions the lifting of martial rule and an amnesty for accused Muslim separatists. An amnesty was extended in 1980 to neutralise thousands of ex-student activists - among them Chaturon -- who joined the Communist Party of Thailand. If approved, a new amnesty now would cover some 10,000 people -- the biggest group since 1980.
Chaturon's plan also includes revising the 12 billion baht (307.7 million dollar) development package, scrapping a planned crackdown on dual nationalities and supporting Islamic schools.
Some also take heart from how the Thai government now appears to view the violence as a domestic issue, after a period of confusion and speculation on terrorist and foreign influences. The talk in the south is that the violence may be linked to drugs, or to feuds between government authorities.
If the new approach takes root, it will not be the first time that Thailand has toned down security measures and applied a political policy to deal with prolonged conflict, given the amnesty it offered to the Communist Party of Thailand in the past.
Indeed, the restiveness in the south has earlier roots than the Communist Party, and has never been completely addressed. But then again, this is also the first time that top political figures have sent a clear signal on a new approach on conflict resolution.
''I believe that majority of the people in the three provinces are practical enough not to demand for something which is not possible,'' said Chaiwat. ''What they have asked for is a fair treatment from the state, not special treatment at all,'' he pointed out.
::: posted by max : 10/28/2004
Okinawans protest U.S. military helicopter crash
* Okinawans protest U.S. military helicopter crash
* 55,000 signatures submitted to protest U.S. chopper crash
* 30,000 protest U.S. chopper crash, demand return of Futemma base
----------------------------------------
A city in Okinawa protested the recent crash of a U.S. military helicopter with a petition signed by 55,726 people addressed to the Japanese and American leaders on Monday, and called for the return of a U.S. air station on the island.
The petition submitted by the city of Ginowan followed a demonstration by 30,000 people on Sunday over the Aug. 13 crash in a university campus. The accident damaged a building and injured the crew.
The petition called for an apology and compensation for the crash damage, an end to U.S. military flights over civilian areas, the return of Futemma Air Station to Japan, and a revision of the agreement governing U.S. military operations in Japan.
"To protect precious lives and peaceful living, the 88,000 residents of Ginowan city strongly and angrily protest the U.S. military helicopter crash and the way it was handled afterward," the petition said. The population of Ginowan is 88,000.
While the crash caused no injuries on the ground, Okinawans say the accident shows the dangers of operating a military installation in an urban environment.
Local police have also complained that the U.S. military blocked them from investigating the crash site, as American authorities say they are entitled to do under the Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA.
Monday's petition, a copy of which was obtained from the Japanese Foreign Ministry, was addressed to U.S. President George W. Bush, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, and Japanese government agencies.
The accident stirred long-standing grievances of residents near the U.S. air station, and prompted Japanese Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba to suggest that the SOFA could be revised.
Japanese and U.S. officials recently agreed to set up a panel to examine the way such accidents are handled and suggest improvements.
Japan and the United States agreed in 1996 to relocate the Futemma base, but environmental concerns have hindered the building of a new heliport atop one of the area's last healthy coral reefs.
The presence of the U.S. military is a sensitive issue in Okinawa, which hosts two-thirds of the 50,000 American troops in Japan. Many Okinawans complain of crowding, noise and crime associated with the military bases.
-----------------------------------------------
30,000 protest U.S. chopper crash, demand return of Futemma base
About 30,000 people gathered in Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture, on Sunday to protest the recent crash of a U.S. military helicopter at a university there and demand that the nearby U.S. Marine Corps Futemma Air Station be closed and returned.
The number of protesters greatly exceeded the municipal government's expected turnout of 10,000 people and was the largest protest against U.S. forces by Okinawa residents since 85,000 gathered in 1995 to protest the rape of an elementary schoolgirl by three U.S. servicemen.
The protesters adopted a resolution with six demands, including an apology and compensation for damage caused by the crash, termination of U.S. military flights over civilian areas, the return of Futemma at an early date and an overhaul of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement, which governs U.S. military operations in Japan.
The chopper incident occurred on Aug. 13, when a CH-53D helicopter, which took off from Futemma, crashed at the campus of nearby Okinawa International University, injuring three crew members and heavily damaging a building. Helicopter parts were also scattered in surrounding residential areas.
The base is located in the center of Ginowan but no one on the ground was hurt in the incident.
"We must have the government begin negotiations to suspend the heliport functions (at Futemma) right now and to have the base shut down and returned," Ginowan Mayor Yoichi Iha said at the gathering held at the university campus.
"Until when do we Ginowan residents have to be worried about the safety of our lives?" said one of the 11 resident representatives in a speech.
A siren was sounded at the protest assembly to mark the moment of the crash and protesters set free 200 doves to represent their hopes to eradicate accidents by U.S. military aircraft.
"I think that the fact that so many Ginowan residents took part in the assembly shows the strong concerns by each and every resident regarding the dangers of the Futemma Air Station, which is located in an urban area," Okinawa Gov. Keiichi Inamine said in a statement.
He added that the prefecture, which hosts the bulk of U.S. forces in Japan, has requested that all flights at the base be grounded until the accident's cause is uncovered and measures to prevent a recurrence are taken.
Japan and the United States have agreed to build a military-civilian offshore facility in Nago, also in Okinawa, to replace the heliport functions of Futemma. However, the construction plan faces strong opposition in Nago and it is expected to take at least 10 more years before Futemma can be relocated.
Sunday's protest was originally scheduled to take place a week earlier on Sept. 5 but was postponed due to a typhoon.
::: posted by Ren : 10/17/2004
Militant groups spooked by US virtual consulate
By Ben O. Tesiorna
* Says virtual consulate will become a spy center in Mindanao
* Protest rallies to greet Ambassador Francis Ricciardone during Wednesday's launching of US virtual consulate
* Protesters believe virtual consulate will be operated from Ateneo
FOR several militant organizations and leaders opposing US presence in Davao City and in Mindanao, the US virtual consulate will serve as America's "spy center" for their interests here in Mindanao.
For those involved in its launching, however, everything is virtual and will thus have no "center", not even a single personnel hanging out in the city.
Bayan Muna party-list Rep. Joel Virador said the establishment of the US virtual embassy in Davao City is part of America's grand plan to maintain its superpower status not just here in the Philippines but all over the world.
"Kadtong Baker Piston ug karon kining (There was Baker Piston, and now the) US virtual consulate is part of the US intervention in the affairs of our country," Virador said.
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan)-Southern Mindanao Region spokesperson Jeppie Ramada, meanwhile, said the US had created several virtual embassies in other parts of the world like Russia in order to protect US interests in the said countries.
According to Gabriela party-list Rep. Liza Maza, the same is true with the US virtual embassy here in Davao City that would be inaugurated tomorrow by no less than US Ambassador Francis Ricciardone.
"Para mas dikit at mas malapit sa mata ng US ang Mindanao, which is considered as a hotbed (in their war against terrorism)," Maza said.
Anti-US protests
Around 2,000 anti-US rallyists are expected to hold massive protests in Davao City tomorrow in time for the arrival of US Ambassador Francis Ricciardone.
Khadidja, a Moro women's group, will hold a protest rally at the Freedom park in front of the Ateneo de Davao University (ADDU) in the morning.
In the afternoon, anti-US delegates from Davao del Norte, Butuan, Cagayan de Oro, Soscsksargen area and Davao City will march through the city streets and will converge near Marco Polo Hotel where the launching of the US virtual consulate will be held.
Evil agenda
Militant leaders are urging the ADDU management not to be part of the US "evil agenda" by way of rejecting the virtual consulate that the militants claimed was going to be located inside the Ateneo Jacinto campus.
"Dili sila angayan magpagamit sa imperyalismong Amerikano kay maro kaayo ning America. Agihon nila na ug mga donation ug mga regalo aron good image sila pero diay lain gyud ang ilang tumong (They shouldn't let themselves be used by the US Imperialist because the US is very sly. They will give donations to prop up their image but will have other hidden agenda)," Virador said.
The militant leader warned that with the presence of the US virtual consulate inside the Ateneo Jacinto campus the Jesuit-run university would now become the center of militant protests just like before when the USIS Library was still in Bajada.
Maza, meanwhile, called on Malaca-ang officials and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to make public the agreement regarding the establishment of the US virtual consulate here in Davao City.
She said once Congress resumes session, they will file a resolution asking DFA to be transparent with their agreement with the American government regarding the virtual embassy.
ADDU president Fr. Edmundo Martinez denied the school will be hosting the virtual consulate.
He admitted they were initially asked to host the launching of the virtual consulate but said that plans changed and the launching was transferred to the Marco Polo Hotel.
A US Embassy personnel who is among those arranging the launch tomorrow also told Sun.Star Davao that what is being launched is a "virtual" consulate, meaning this will have no stations and no personnel, just a formal announcement and demonstration of how anyone who has transactions with the US Embassy can have access through the Internet.
(October 5, 2004 issue)
::: posted by Ren : 10/09/2004
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